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I. INTRODUCTION

Hedge funds are our modern titans of industry, and like their
predecessors they now represent the best and the worst of the new global
economy. These minimally regulated investment entities1—in which
historically only super-rich investors could have an interest2—have
recently had profound impacts on financial markets around the world. In
early 1992, for example, George Soros, the now-famous hedge fund
manager, made it big by using his hedge fund, Soros Fund Management
LLC,3 to leverage a massive bet that the British pound would be ejected
from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.4 The bet reportedly earned
Mr. Soros over a billion dollars and the title of “the man who broke the
Bank of England.”5 A few years later, after another huge currency bet, the
Malaysian Prime Minister accused Mr. Soros of bringing down the
Malaysian currency.6

1. For a more detailed definition of hedge funds, the investment strategies they pursue, the
risks and benefits they produce, and other attributes commonly associated with them, see infra
notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 39–51 and accompanying text (discussing the exemption available to
hedge funds under the Securities Act of 1933 when offerings are privately given to “accredited
investors”); infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (discussing the exemption available to hedge
funds under the Investment Company Act of 1940 when the beneficial owners are “qualified
purchasers”). But see infra notes 209–52 and accompanying text (describing the increasing problem
of hedge funds directly and indirectly reaching unsophisticated retail investors who do not meet the
statutory wealth requirements).
3. Hedge funds are typically structured as limited partnerships (LPs) or limited-liability
companies (LLCs) for the tax advantages and limited liability associated with these organizational
structures. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 9 n.27 (2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC: HEDGE FUND
GROWTH]. However, some hedge funds also structure themselves as corporations or business trusts.
Id.
4. See Robert Brown & Watson Wyatt, So What Are Hedge Funds?, BBC NEWS, Dec. 14,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4499290.stm.
5. Adam Shell, $363M Is Average Pay for Top Hedge Fund Managers, USA TODAY, May
26, 2006, at 1B.
6. See Hedge-Fund Milestones, WALL ST . J. ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB115394214778218146.html [hereinafter Milestones].
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In the summer of 1998, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), an
extremely over-leveraged hedge fund,7 burst onto the public scene after its
bets turned sour, nearly causing a catastrophic collapse of the world
banking system.8 LTCM used approximately $2.2 billion in investors’
funds to leverage approximately $125 billion worth of borrowed money,
which LTCM further leveraged into $1.25 trillion in open trading
positions.9 The U.S. Treasury Department came to the rescue when these
positions turned against LTCM and arranged a buyout of LTCM’s
defaulted positions.10
In September 2006, Amaranth Advisers, another highly leveraged
hedge fund, lost roughly $5 billion in value in a week when it lost its bets
on the natural-gas market.11 Further, in the first two months of 2007, Red
7. “Financial leverage is increased by having greater amounts of debt in the capital structure
of the firm.” STANLEY G. EAKINS, FINANCE 350 (2d ed. update 2005). “[L]everage allows the debtfinanced firm to take advantage of strong sales more effectively than the all-equity firm.” Id. at 343.
A common example of leveraging, especially during real-estate booms, is to use real property as
collateral to borrow the funds necessary to purchase other real property or business assets.
8. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory
Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 983–86; Steven Lipin et al., Bailout
Blues: How a Big Hedge Fund Marketed Its Expertise and Shrouded Its Risks, WALL ST. J., Sept.
25, 1998, at A1; Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters, so the
Fed Persuades Big Banks to Ante Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1998, at A1.
9. See Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, Troubled Investment Fund’s Bets Now Estimated at
$1.25 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1998, at A1.
10. See Paredes, supra note 8, at 984. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS
FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (providing an in-depth
discussion of LTCM, its managers, and their trading strategies, which ultimately led to the fund’s
momentous failure and the near collapse of the world banking system).
11. See Ann Davis, Private Money: The New Financial Order—Blue Flameout: How Giant
Bets on Natural Gas Sank Brash Hedge-Fund Trader, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at A1; see also
Daisy Maxey, At Hedge Funds, Study Exit Guidelines, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2006, at B4. The
Amaranth collapse is particularly worrisome given that some commentators have claimed that
Amaranth’s huge losses were at least partly due to John Arnold—the manager of a rival hedge fund,
Centarus Energy—using his fund to drive gas prices against Amaranth’s bets. See Ann Davis et al.,
Hedge-Fund Hardball: Amid Amaranth’s Crisis, Other Players Profited, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2007, at A1. As more hedge funds enter the market, typical investment strategies stop working and
many investment positions are squeezed as more hedge funds invest in the same positions. See
Susan Pulliam, Private Money: The New Financial Order—The Hedge-Fund King is Getting
Nervous, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2006, at A1. There is also a danger that if hedge funds sell their
positions en masse, the share price would tumble, leaving other investors holding the bag. See id.
In fact, the massive market swings in August 2007 were due in part to hedge fund trading
activities—particularly their use of computer-driven models. See, e.g., E.S. Browning, Lessons of
Past May Offer Clues to Market’s Fate, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2007, at A1; Landon Thomas, Jr.,
Pack Mentality Among Hedge Funds Fuels Market Volatility, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007, at C1;
Gregory Zuckerman, Dear Investors, We’re . . . , WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2007, at C1; Gregory
Zuckerman, Hedge Funds: First, You Get the Good News, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2007, at C1.
Amaranth was back in the news in early 2007 because it sent letters to its former investors in an
effort to stem the potential litigation against it. Week in Review, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Apr.
9, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 6756247. The letter offered to distribute the fund’s remaining
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Kite Management’s hedge fund lost nearly twenty percent of its $1 billion
metals-trading investments when its bets that copper and zinc futures
would rise met sharply declining spot prices.12
The above incidents all involved hedge funds engaging in legal
activities. However, many recent events have exposed the hedge fund
industry as one wrought with illegality.13 For example, in 2003, a number
of hedge funds were implicated in the mutual fund market-timing scandal
that rocked Wall Street.14 Within the last couple of years, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has investigated instances of insider
trading by numerous hedge funds, including one of the nation’s most
prominent funds, Pequot Capital Management.15 And in early March 2007,
the SEC brought one of the largest insider-trading actions since the mid1980s, and the individuals charged included several hedge fund
assets more quickly to investors who agreed not to sue the fund. Id. This recent move by Amaranth
deserves watching because other hedge fund managers are surely interested in whether such a move
could insulate them from litigation in the event their funds collapse. But see infra note 224 (noting
that an Amaranth investor has already sued the failed hedge fund).
12. Lisa Yuriko Thomas, Troubles of a Hedge Fund, Red Kite, Pummel Copper and Zinc
Prices, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2007, at B2.
13. See, e.g., Government Rejects New Rules for Hedge Funds, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 22, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17279806/ (indicating that since 2001 the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has brought over sixty actions against hedge fund managers for defrauding
investors of more than $1 billion).
14. See Ann Davis et al., Fund Probe Turns to Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2003, at
C1. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC at 70: Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds
and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission Is
Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 929–33 (2005) (describing the mutual fund markettiming scandal); Jeff Schwartz, Mutual Fund Conflicts of Interest in the Wake of Short-Term
Trading Scandals: Encouraging Structural Change Through Shareholder Choice, 2 N.Y.U. J. L.
& BUS. 91, 91–93 (2005) (same). Recently, numerous hedge funds have been fined or prosecuted
for market timing. See Judith Burns, Alger Settles Trading Charges, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2007,
at C2; Jaime Levy Pessin, Brokers Get Focus in Market Timing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2006, at
C11. Moreover, in March 2007, Beacon Rock Capital LLC was charged with defrauding mutual
funds of $2.4 million in the first criminal case in U.S. history against a hedge fund for deceptive
market timing. Daisy Maxey, Hedge Fund Is Charged over Market Timing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2007, at C13.
15. See Walt Bogdanich & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Is Reported to Be Examining a Big
Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1; Serena Ng, Moving the Market—Tracking the
Numbers/Street Sleuth: Trading Groups Are Agitating over Apparent Leaks on Street, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 14, 2006, at C3 (quoting law professor Larry Ribstein as saying: “There’s definitely a lot
of trading on nonpublic information, and that’s only going to increase with the growing clout of
hedge funds”); Stephen Taub, SEC Probing Private Equity, Hedge Funds, CFO.COM, Oct. 19,
2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8069819?f=search; see also Kara Scannell & Randall Smith,
SEC Boosts Probe for Wall Street Leaks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at C15; Emily Thornton et al.,
More Heat on Hedge Funds, BUS . WK. ONLINE , Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/06_06/b3970066.htm; infra notes 213–17 and accompanying text (describing the
unique ability of hedge funds to push the limits of legality by gathering vital information about
publicly and non-publicly traded companies via “consulting networks” and congressional
lobbyists).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss1/4

4

Hall: The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in our Financial

2008]

TH E ELEPH AN T IN TH E RO O M

187

employees.16
These examples are just a small sampling of the numerous instances in
which hedge funds have had potentially disastrous effects on the market,17
pushed the limits of legal activities, or become entangled in criminal
activities.18 But most worrisome is unsophisticated investors’ new found
access to hedge funds through endowments, pensions, and other charitable
entities,19 funds of hedge funds (FOHFs),20 and publicly traded shares of
hedge fund management companies.21
Against this backdrop of illegality, the D.C. Circuit, in Goldstein v.
SEC,22 vacated an SEC rule intended to protect investors from hedge fund
abuses.23 This rule, the “Hedge Fund Rule,”24 would have allowed the SEC
to gather vital information about the secret and elusive world of hedge
funds.25 Unfortunately, the Goldstein court’s unsound and narrow
reasoning serves as a prime example of the extent to which the current
regulatory regime has ignored the fundamental motivations of our
securities laws.26
This Note argues that the current judicial and regulatory stances on
hedge funds fail to appreciate and account for the tremendous dangers that
hedge funds pose not only to the security of our financial markets but also
to the individual investors that securities regulations are designed to
protect. To appreciate fully these failures, it is necessary to understand

16. See Robert E. Kessler, Inside a Trading Scandal, NEWSDAY, Mar. 14, 2007, at A35. By
the end of July 2007, seven of the individuals charged with insider trading had pleaded guilty. See
Chad Bray, Former Trader Pleads Guilty in Inside-Information Case, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, July
26, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118540595053678230.html.
17. Quite remarkably, Richard Bookstaber, a Wall Street pioneer who has a doctorate in
economics and now manages a hedge fund, recently published a book that explains how hedge
funds will contribute to an inevitable financial meltdown. Greg Ip, A Street Pioneer Fears a
Blowup, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2007, at C1; see also RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR
OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION (2007).
18. See, e.g., infra notes 104–15 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 224–32 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which pensions,
endowments, and other charitable entities invest in hedge funds and the threats posed by these
investments to the individual beneficiaries).
20. See infra notes 237–42 and accompanying text (discussing FOHFs and the dangers they
pose to individual investors).
21. See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text (describing the recent phenomenon of
hedge fund management companies going public and the risks accompanying the phenomenon).
22. 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
23. Id. at 884.
24. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 17 C.F.R. pts. 275,
279 (2006), invalidated by Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873.
25. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,061 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (noting that the registration
requirement under the Hedge Fund Rule would allow the SEC to gather data on hedge funds by
permitting the SEC to inspect the hedge fund’s financial books).
26. See infra Parts III, IV.A (describing the Goldstein court’s and the current SEC’s failures
to address adequately the dangers that hedge funds pose to individual investors).
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better the history of hedge funds and their recent explosion in popularity
and in market power.27 To aid in this understanding, Part II of this Note
discusses the four principal acts that regulate the securities markets and
how hedge funds exist and function outside those regulations. Part III
analyzes the Goldstein decision and explains the administrative law and
normative failures of the court’s analysis. In Part IV, this Note discusses
the unsatisfactory reactions to Goldstein and offers a few modest proposals
to address the dangers that hedge funds pose. Part V concludes.
II. THE EXISTENCE AND HISTORY OF HEDGE FUNDS
Definitions for hedge funds abound,28 but the following is an accurate
and still comprehensible definition: “[T]he term ‘hedge
fund[]’ . . . generally is used to refer to an entity that holds a pool of
securities and perhaps other assets, whose interests are not sold in a
registered public offering and which is not registered as an investment
company under the Investment Company Act.”29 Hedge funds are
distinguished from other investment vehicles by a number of unique
characteristics, which typically include the following: requiring the hedge
fund manager to invest a substantial amount of her own assets in the
fund,30 charging significant management and performance fees,31 and using
27. As will be discussed more thoroughly throughout this Note, a number of factors have
contributed to the surge in popularity and power of hedge funds. Some of these factors are positive
(e.g., hedge funds help make markets more efficient and help some investors manage their
investment risk), see infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text, while others are negative (e.g.,
speculating investors looking for the type of returns they saw during the dot-com boom, and risktaking hedge fund managers pushing the limits of legality or even trouncing upon the law), see infra
notes 103–15 and accompanying text.
28. See Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundation for Global Market
Crises: Hedge Funds, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L.F. 5, 6 (1999); Alex R. McClean, Note, The
Extraterritorial Implications of the SEC’s New Rule Change to Regulate Hedge Funds, 38 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 105, 106 (2006); DAVID A. VAUGHAN, COMMENTS FOR THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ROUNDTABLE ON HEDGE FUNDS: SELECTED DEFINITIONS OF “HEDGE
FUND” (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm (providing
numerous definitions of “hedge fund”).
29. SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 3 (footnote omitted).
30. See, e.g., Erik J. Greupner, Comment, Hedge Funds Are Headed Down-Market: A Call
for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2003).
31. See Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 684
(2000); Greupner, supra note 30, at 1559. The typical hedge fund charges a management fee of
1%–2% of the total assets and a performance fee of 20% of the profits. See, e.g., Gibson, supra, at
684. However, these fees are only typical, and many hedge fund managers charge higher
management and performance fees. See, e.g., Pulliam, supra note 11 (noting that one hedge fund
manager keeps 50% of the fund’s gains and charges a 3% management fee); Shell, supra note 5
(noting that the highest paid hedge fund manager in 2006 made $1.5 billion by charging a 5%
management fee and a 44% performance fee). Although there is no scholarship investigating the
similarity between performance fees in the hedge fund setting and options grants in the corporate
setting, the similarities are obvious. Both assume that managers’ interests will be more closely
aligned with investors because of these performance-based incentives. However, the recent
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aggressive investment strategies.32 However, despite these unique
characteristics, hedge funds are ultimately distinguished “by the extent to
which the [SEC] does not regulate them. The standard hedge fund
structure [ensures] that a hedge fund is not subject to the principal
regulatory requirements of the federal securities laws.”33 How is it that
hedge funds escape those principal regulatory requirements?
A. Hedge Funds: The Products of Loopholes
Most hedge funds structure themselves to avoid registration under the
four principal securities regulations34: the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act),35 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),36
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Company Act),37 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).38 The remainder of Part
II.A discusses how hedge funds avoid registration under each of these acts.
1. Exemption from the Securities Act
Hedge funds typically avoid registering under the Securities Act by
providing interests in the hedge fund only through private offerings.39 By
offering an interest through a private offering, hedge funds take advantage
of the private-placement exemption from registration found in § 4(2) of the
Securities Act.40

corporate scandals suggest that the incentive is really to take unnecessary risks and engage in illicit
behavior. See generally Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 4, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html (indicating that
over 140 companies have come under federal scrutiny for past stock option grants). In the wake of
these scandals, many companies have removed stock options from their compensation packages.
See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin & William M. Bulkeley, IBM Ends Director Stock Options, Spotlighting
Popular Perk’s Decline, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at A1; Joann S. Lublin, Untainted Firms Alter
How They Offer Options, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2006, at B1.
32. See Gibson, supra note 31, at 683; McClean, supra note 28, at 110. Examples of the
investment strategies that hedge funds use include the following: relative value, event driven, short
selling, market-neutral, and global asset allocating. Gibson, supra note 31, at 686. See generally
SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 33–43 (discussing hedge fund investment strategies);
Gibson, supra note 31, at 686–88 (same); McClean, supra note 28, at 110–11 (same).
33. Paredes, supra note 8, at 976.
34. SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 11–22; see also, e.g., Gibson, supra note
31, at 688–99.
35. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78nn (West 2007).
37. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (West 2007).
38. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (West 2007).
39. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 13–18; Gibson, supra note 31, at
688–91.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000); see also SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at
13–18; Gibson, supra note 31, at 689. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 4.24, at 205–11 (rev. 5th ed. 2006) (describing the private-placement exemption of
§ 4(2)).
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In the seminal case addressing § 4(2)’s private-placement exemption,
SEC v. Ralston Purina, Co.,41 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that for an
offering to fall within the exemption, the parties receiving the offer must
be able to fend for themselves.42 That is, parties receiving the offer cannot
be the type of party that the Securities Act is meant to protect.43 Further,
the availability of the exemption depends on the knowledge of the parties
receiving the offer and is limited to situations when those parties receive
information comparable to that afforded by registration under the
Securities Act.44
To clarify the requirements of this exemption, the SEC promulgated
Rule 506 of Regulation D,45 which provides a safe harbor for offering
parties that meet the conditions of the Rule.46 Generally, hedge funds may
use this safe harbor by privately offering interests in the hedge fund only
to “accredited investors.”47 Roughly, accredited investors include
individuals with a net worth above $1,000,000, individuals with an annual
income above $200,000,48 or institutional investors with over $5,000,000
in assets.49 In sum, hedge funds avoid registration under the Securities Act

41. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
42. Id. at 124–25.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 126–27. Hedge funds ostensibly meet this disclosure requirement by giving
investors a private-placement memorandum that summarizes, among other things, the fund’s
trading strategies, its valuation methods, and its past performance. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH,
supra note 3, at 46–49. The inadequacy of these private-placements memorandums is obvious
because there are no substantive requirements; thus, most hedge fund managers reserve the right
to change investment strategies and to use valuation strategies of their own devising and choosing.
See id.
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007).
46. See id. § 230.506(a); see also HAZEN, supra note 40, § 4.25, at 211–15. See generally
HAZEN, supra note 40, § 1.42[2][C], at 32 (“A safe harbor rule sets forth conditions under which
the SEC will take the position that the law has been complied with.”).
47. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 14–15. In theory, a hedge fund could
offer an interest to an unlimited number of accredited investors and still meet the exemption
requirements because accredited investors do not count toward the thirty-five purchaser limit of
Rule 506. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2007). However, the SEC has cautioned that depending on
the circumstances any large offering may violate Regulation D’s prohibition against general
solicitation and general advertising. See Proposed Revisions of Certain Exemptions from the
Registration Procedures of the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers
and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, 23 SEC Docket 446 (Aug. 7, 1981), 1981 WL 31063,
at *15 n.30. This prohibition on general solicitation and general advertising conflicts with the
prevalent use of the Internet by hedge funds, and such use may open the hedge fund to allegations
that it is generally soliciting and advertising. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at
44–46.
48. To be specific, to qualify as an accredited investor under the annual-income standard, the
investor must have had an annual income of over $200,000 for the last two years and must have a
reasonable expectation that this income level will continue. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007).
49. See id.; see also Gibson, supra note 31, at 688–90. The SEC recently proposed raising
the wealth requirements for qualification as an accredited investor. See Prohibition of Fraud by
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by privately offering interests only to fairly wealthy individuals or
institutions,50 both of which are presumed to be able to fend for
themselves.51
2. Exemption from the Exchange Act
Hedge funds typically avoid registration under the Exchange Act by
having fewer than 500 owners of record.52 This exemption is available
because § 12(g) of the Exchange Act requires registration only for classes
of securities having 500 or more owners of record and over $1 million in
assets.53 Because hedge funds avoid registering under § 12(g), they are
generally able to avoid the beneficial-ownership reporting requirements
under § 13 and § 16 of the Exchange Act.54 However, a hedge fund will be
required in some instances to report its ownership of other equity securities
that are registered under § 12.55

Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 404–06 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230,
275). For a discussion of this proposal, see infra notes 255, 258–62 and accompanying text.
50. There is a further requirement that a hedge fund relying on the Rule 506 exemption must
exercise reasonable care to ensure that its investors are not investing with the intent to distribute
their interests to the public. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d)(1) (2007).
51. Basically, Rule 506 uses wealth as a proxy for financial sophistication. However, this is
undoubtedly problematic. See Helen Parry, Hedge Funds, Hot Markets and the High Net Worth
Investor: A Case for Greater Protection?, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 703, 718–19 (2001) (arguing
that even millionaires need to be protected from the dangers of risky investments). See generally
C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J.
1081, 1123–25 (discussing the use of wealth as a substitute for actual financial sophistication and
the difficulties this substitution creates). Moreover, extremely wealthy investors may not be able
to accurately assess risk, see id. at 1123, especially the risks associated with the exotic strategies
used by many hedge funds, see Gibson, supra note 31, at 713 (discussing a few of the more
complex trading strategies). Interestingly, prior to Rule 506 of Regulation D, the SEC’s old rule
for determining if an investor was an accredited investor, Rule 146, required the offering party to
assess the actual financial sophistication of each offeree and purchaser. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)
(1976), repealed and replaced by 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1988). As one commentator remarked,
“Whereas before, private placement purchasers had to be smart, now they need only be rich.”
Fletcher, supra, at 1123. England’s process for determining financial sophistication does not use
wealth as a proxy, but instead, much like the SEC’s old rule, requires an offeror to assess its
offerees’ actual investment knowledge and experience. See McClean, supra note 28, at 127.
52. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 18–19; see also Gibson, supra note 31,
at 696.
53. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (Supp. IV 2004).
Moreover, because hedge funds typically avoid registration under the Securities Act, they will limit
their owners to accredited investors. For a description of the exemption available under the
Securities Act, see supra notes 39–51 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for
exemptions under the Securities Act).
54. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78p (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
55. A hedge fund will have to report its holdings to the SEC if, for instance, it acquires
greater than 5% of a class of equity securities or if it holds accounts totaling more than $100 million
in equity securities. See id. § 78m. Interestingly, Phillip Goldstein—the main plaintiff in Goldstein
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3. Exclusions from the Company Act
Although hedge funds fit within the general definition of an investment
company,56 the Company Act provides two statutory exclusions57 from the
definition.58 First, under § 3(c)(1), the Company Act excludes any
investment company that has 100 or fewer beneficial owners of its
securities and that does not plan to make a public offering.59 In general,
each investor in a hedge fund is counted toward the 100-investor limit.60

v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), which is discussed at length in Part III infra—has claimed
that he will sue the SEC again if it attempts to enforce one of § 13’s reporting requirements. See
Editorial, Hedge Fund Secrets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at A16. Mr. Goldstein claims that the
SEC’s reporting requirements under § 13 effectively allow the SEC to seize a hedge fund
manager’s intellectual property rights. See id. This is a novel claim, but it seems to have little merit.
However, there is a recent trend in intellectual property to grant patents for “unique processes.” See
William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to This Invention?,
59 FLA. L. REV. 232, 237–44 (2007) (discussing the patenting of tax loopholes as unique
processes). Professor Drennan questions the wisdom of granting such patents in most circumstances
because they may undermine some of the rationales for intellectual-property protection. See id. at
271–96. By analogy to the patentable tax loophole, a hedge fund manager may be able to patent
an investment process if it is truly unique and worthy of protection as intellectual property, but the
same concerns Professor Drennan raises in the tax arena will apply to patents in the hedge fund
arena. For a brief discussion of the merits of such intellectual-property protection of hedge fund
managers’ strategies, see infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text.
56. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2000) (defining
an investment company as an issuer that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities”).
57. Technically, there is a difference between exemptions and exclusions: the former are not
specifically provided for in the statutory language, but the latter are. See HAZEN, supra note 40,
§ 20.3, at 753. For example, a statute may explicitly exclude teachers, lawyers, and accountants
from registering as investment advisers, but may exempt from registration those individuals who
advise only sophisticated individuals. See, e.g., Investment Adviser Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 80b-2(a)(11)(B), (a)(11)(E) (West 2007). The practical effect is that none of the statutory
requirements apply to the excluded parties, but all statutory requirements other than registering
apply to the exempted parties. See HAZEN, supra note 40, § 21.2[3], at 796–98.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b) (2000). The Company Act does include exemptions; however, those
exemptions are generally not available for hedge funds. See id. § 80a-6.
59. See id. § 80a-3(c)(1); see also SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 11–12;
Gibson, supra note 31, at 693–97. Hedge funds must follow the requirements of § 4(2) of the
Securities Act to qualify for the exclusion for not making a public offering. See Gibson, supra note
31, at 695. For a discussion of § 4(2) of the Securities Act, see supra notes 39–51 and
accompanying text. Additionally, although it is not required to meet § 3(c)(1)’s exclusion under the
Company Act, hedge funds will pursue only accredited investors to avoid registration under the
Securities Act. Cf. supra notes 39–51 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for
exemptions under the Securities Act).
60. See Gibson, supra note 31, at 694–95 (noting that most hedge funds have fewer than 100
investors but that hedge fund managers must pay close attention to the number of investors to
continue to qualify for § 3(c)(1)’s exclusion). Spouses who have jointly invested in a hedge fund
are counted as one beneficial owner under the Company Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).
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However, if a hedge fund claims an “investing entity” as an investor61 and
that investing entity holds 10% or more of the outstanding voting shares
of the hedge fund, then the hedge fund must “look through” the investing
entity and count the number of individual investors in the investing
entity.62
Second, under § 3(c)(7),63 the Company Act excludes from its reach
any investment company whose outstanding securities are owned
exclusively by “qualified purchasers.”64 The Company Act generally
defines a qualified purchaser as (1) any person who owns not less than $5
million in investment assets, (2) any family-owned company that owns not
less than $5 million in investment assets, (3) any trust not formed for the
purpose of investing in a § 3(c)(7) fund and whose trustee(s) or settlor(s)
are qualified purchasers, and (4) any person, acting on her own account or
on the account of other qualified purchasers, who owns and invests on a
discretionary basis not less than $25 million.65 Thus, hedge funds are
61. Investors that are corporations are “investing entities” under the Company Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A).
62. See id. § 80a-3(c); see also SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 11 n.34;
Gibson, supra note 31, at 694–95. The “look-through” concept becomes important, as discussed
in Part III infra in reference to the Goldstein case, because as in the Company Act scheme, whether
a hedge fund has to look through an entity determines its registration requirements under the
Advisers Act. Although there is no case law on point, under the Company Act this look-through
concept seems to be of little consequence because a crafty hedge fund manager could just set up
a Russian-doll framework to avoid registering even if an investing entity was going to hold more
than 10%. That is, if an investing entity will own more than 10% of outstanding voting shares, the
hedge fund could simply require the investing entity to set up another entity to hold 100% of the
interests in the investing entity. Thus, when the hedge fund looks through the investing entity, all
there is a single entity, which will not increase the count to the 100-investor limit. It seems such
a Russian-doll setup could go on ad infinitum. See infra Part III.
63. This exclusion did not exist until Congress passed the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 209(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3432 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2000)). This is important because prior to 1996, hedge funds could
depend only on the § 3(c)(1) exclusion, which limited hedge funds to having 100 or fewer
accredited investors. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. As discussed more thoroughly
below, the NSMIA has had an enormous effect on the hedge fund industry. See infra notes 87–98
and accompanying text.
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). A hedge fund may have an unlimited number of qualifiedpurchaser investors and still be excluded from the Company Act under § 3(c)(7); however, as a
practical matter, to avoid registering under the Exchange Act, hedge funds limit the number of
qualified purchasers to 499. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 13. For a discussion
of the registration exemption under the Exchange Act, see supra notes 52–55 and accompanying
text.
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A). As discussed below, the fourth possibility for
constituting a qualified purchaser is worrisome because the person who is actually managing the
$25 million or greater in investments does not have to exhibit any level of “sophistication.” See
infra notes 224–32 and accompanying text (discussing endowments’, pensions’, and charitable
organizations’ beneficiaries and how the beneficiaries, who are generally not sophisticated and
therefore need SEC protection, are the ones who will be harmed by a hedge fund manager’s
investment decisions).
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excluded from the Company Act because they allow only a small number
of extremely wealthy persons to invest in the hedge fund.
4. Exemption from the Advisers Act
“Virtually all hedge fund [managers] meet the definition of ‘investment
adviser’ under the Advisers Act.”66 Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act
defines “investment adviser” as follows:
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability
of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities . . . .67
However, prior to the SEC’s enactment of the Hedge Fund Rule68 and now
again after the Goldstein court vacated the Rule,69 most hedge fund
managers avoid registering under the Advisers Act by meeting three
requirements.70 The hedge fund manager (1) cannot hold herself out to the
public as an adviser,71 (2) cannot advise any registered investment
company,72 and (3) must have fewer than fifteen clients during the
preceding twelve months.73 The third requirement is a de minimis one74
66. SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 20; see also Gibson, supra note 31, at 696
(“The general partner of a hedge fund falls within the definition of an investment adviser . . . .”).
67. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2(a)(11) (West 2007).
68. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 17 C.F.R. pts. 275,
279 (2006), invalidated by Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
69. See infra Part III (arguing that the Goldstein court improperly vacated the SEC’s Hedge
Fund Rule).
70. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 21–22. Notwithstanding a hedge fund
manager’s ability to avoid registering under the Advisers Act, prior to the Goldstein decision some
managers had voluntarily registered as investment advisers. In 2003, the SEC estimated that
approximately two-thirds of hedge fund managers were not registered as investment advisers. Id.
at 22. Prior to the Goldstein decision, many hedge fund managers voluntarily registered with the
SEC in anticipation of the Hedge Fund Rule, but after the decision, hundreds of managers withdrew
their registration from the SEC. Siobhan Hughes, More Hedge Funds Leave the Ranks of SEC’s
Registry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2006, at C4. Approximately two months after the Goldstein
decision, 106 hedge fund managers had withdrawn, and within five months that number increased
to 275. Id.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000). The SEC has stated a few behaviors that will cause it to
consider a party as holding itself out to the public as an investment adviser: maintaining a listing
as an investment adviser in a telephone or business directory; expressing a willingness to accept
new clients; or using letterhead indicating any investment-adviser activities. See Gibson, supra note
31, at 698.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
73. Id.
74. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 21 (referring to the fifteen-client
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with a complicated history, the end result of which is the Goldstein
decision.75
B. A Brief History of Hedge Funds
By avoiding regulation under the four principal securities acts,76 hedge
funds have for years existed in the shadows of the financial world.77 The
hedge fund industry began modestly in 1949 when Alfred Jones began a
hedge fund that used moderately leveraged money to take long positions78
in undervalued stocks and short positions79 in overvalued stocks.80 Mr.
Jones’s fund had a 670% rate of return from 1955 to 1965, reportedly
higher than any other fund in the world.81 Hedge funds still use this
long–short strategy, but more complex and aggressive strategies have

limitation as a de minimis requirement).
75. As discussed below, the definition, or lack thereof, of the term “client” was dispositive
in the Goldstein decision. See infra Part III.A.
76. Although hedge funds typically avoid registering under the four principal securities acts,
other regulations often apply to the funds, their managers, or both. See SEC: HEDGE FUND
GROWTH, supra note 3, at 23–32 (discussing other regulatory regimes that implicate hedge fund
activities, including the Commodity Exchange Act, the rules promulgated by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, the provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act, Department of Treasury regulations, and various state laws); see also Gibson, supra note 31,
at 699–704 (discussing the potential regulation of hedge funds by the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission). Interestingly, with the increased number and power of hedge funds, they have picked
up other legal baggage and now face the same employment-related issues as the rest of the
employment industry. See Anita Raghavan & Peter Lattman, Hedge Fund’s New Fight: The
Boss—As Assets Soar, So Do Employment Lawsuits, Just Like Widget Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24,
2007, at B1.
77. As Professor Frank Partnoy described the problem with hedge fund secrecy: “Financial
markets of any kind do not function well in the dark.” Frank Partnoy, Road Rules for Hedge Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at A33. This statement echoes Brandeis’s oft-quoted statement, which
underlies much of the disclosure requirements of all securities law: “Sunlight is said to be the best
of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S
MONEY 62 (Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper & Row 1967) (1914).
78. Basically, investing long is the traditional investment strategy—investing in something
today under the belief that it will increase in value. This strategy has been defined as an
“investment approach to the stock market in which an investor seeks appreciation by holding a
stock for 12 months or more.” BARRON’S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 336
(5th ed. 1998) (defining “long term”).
79. Short selling is defined as the “sale of a security or commodity futures contract not owned
by the seller; a technique used (1) to take advantage of an anticipated decline in the price or (2) to
protect a profit in a Long Position.” Id. at 556 (defining “selling short”). A short position is
different from a long position insofar as the investor that “shorts” the asset believes the underlying
asset of the investment will decrease in value. Thus, the idea is to borrow an overvalued stock with
the intent to later purchase the same stock at a lower price.
80. See McClean, supra note 28, at 113.
81. Id.
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emerged as the industry has grown.82
The number of hedge funds and the assets they managed increased
steadily from the 1960s to the mid-1980s.83 However, in the roughly ten
years from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, two elements combined to
provide the catalyst for the recent explosive growth of hedge funds.
The first element was the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 203(b)(3)-1,
which is a safe-harbor rule84 that contains a no-look-through provision.85
Rule 203(b)(3)-1 permits a hedge fund manager to count the hedge fund
as her client, and not the individual investors, when determining whether
she must register under the Advisers Act.86 The second element was
Congress’s enactment of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996 (NSMIA).87 The NSMIA amended various provisions of the
Company Act, and the most important amendment for hedge funds was the
addition of § 3(c)(7).88 Section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act permits a
hedge fund to sell to an unlimited number of qualified purchasers without
having to register as an investment company.89 The combination of safe-

82. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (indicating various investment strategies that
hedge funds use).
83. See McClean, supra note 28, at 113.
84. For a brief description of safe-harbor rules, see supra note 46.
85. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2007). This safe-harbor rule is very important to the hedge
fund industry because prior to this rule’s passage hedge fund general partners were considered
investment advisers; therefore, hedge funds could have only fourteen or fewer investors to meet the
de minimis requirements of § 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940
§ 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000); see also Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 869–71
(2d Cir. 1977), overruled in part on other grounds by Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
86. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1; see also SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at
21; Gibson, supra note 31, at 698; Paredes, supra note 8, at 988–90. Rule 203(b)(3)-1 permitted
a hedge fund manager to manage the investments of 1,386 accredited investors without having to
register under any of the four principal securities acts (i.e., the manager could manage fourteen
hedge funds without having to register under the Advisers Act, and each hedge fund could have
ninety-nine accredited investors (14 x 99 = 1,386)). Such a number of investors is certainly not de
minimis. Cf. supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing the fifteen-client limitation as a de
minimis requirement). The SEC passed the Hedge Fund Rule in 2004, which, among other things,
eliminated the no-look-through provision in safe-harbor Rule 203(b)(3)-1. See Registration Under
the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279 (2006), invalidated by
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
87. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
88. This amendment is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2000).
89. See id. For a discussion of this exclusion, see supra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.
Practically, a hedge fund will allow only 499 investors into any one of its hedge funds to avoid
registering under the Exchange Act. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. After passage
of the NSMIA, a hedge fund manager could manage investments from 6,986 investors without
having to register under any of the four principal securities acts (i.e., the manager could manage
fourteen hedge funds without having to register under the Advisers Act, and then could have 499
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harbor Rule 203(b)(3)-1 and the unlimited-qualified-purchasers provision
has caused the phenomenal growth recently seen in the hedge fund
industry.90
In 1990, approximately 300 hedge funds managed $39 billion in
assets.91 By 2001, those numbers had grown to nearly 6,000 hedge funds
managing over $550 billion in assets.92 And by 2006, over 9,000 hedge
funds93 managed at least $1.89 trillion in assets.94 Further, by 2006,
numerous hedge funds each managed over $10 billion in assets.95 The
sheer growth of hedge funds is certainly impressive, and this growth is
even more impressive compared to that of other market
participants—hedge funds have outpaced nearly everyone.
From 2002 to 2006, the assets in mutual funds approximately doubled,
but the assets in hedge funds almost quadrupled during the same period.96
Moreover, hedge funds engage in enormous volumes of trading,
accounting for 40%–50% of the daily trading volume in the major
securities markets.97 And alarmingly, a couple of hedge funds each account

qualified purchaser investors in each fund without having to register under the Company Act (14
x 499 = 6,986)). See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 89 n.292. Again, such a high
number of investors certainly is not de minimis. Cf. supra notes 74, 86 and accompanying text
(describing the fifteen-investor limit as a de minimis requirement and contrasting that with the large
number of investors hedge funds are able to accept without registering).
90. See Greupner, supra note 30, at 1562–63 (“Based on the growth of total hedge fund assets
before and after 1996, it appears that NSMIA has in part served as a catalyst for the increase.”).
91. See id at 1561. Because the hedge fund industry shrouds itself in secrecy, all of the
statistics available to the public are necessarily incomplete. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra
note 3, at 77–78. The SEC admits that it lacks “accurate information about how many hedge funds
operate in the United States, their assets or who controls them.” Id. at 77.
92. See Greupner, supra note 30, at 1561.
93. Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2006, at A1.
94. See US Hedge Funds with $35 Billion Closed in 2006—Survey, REUTERS NEWS, Mar. 19,
2007 [hereinafter Hedge Funds Closed]. From 2005 to 2006, hedge fund assets grew by 24%. Id.
One source also estimates that hedge funds manage approximately 5% of U.S. financial assets. See
Jesse Westbrook & Otis Bilodeau, Republican Senator Seeks to Prevent Insider Trading Tied to
Hedge Funds, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 24, 2006, at 1R, available at 2006 WLNR 20375539.
95. See, e.g., Davis et al., supra note 11 (describing a hedge fund with over $13 billion under
management); Pulliam, supra note 11 (noting that Steven Cohen’s hedge fund manages over $10
billion in assets); Landon Thomas, Jr., With Cash in Hand, Hedge Fund Chiefs Join Political Fray,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A1 (indicating that a hedge fund managed by Richard Perry has $12
billion in assets).
96. Compare Erin E. Arvedlund, Hedging Their Bets: Fund Groups Offer Vehicles Once
Meant Only for the Rich, BARRON’S, Jan. 7, 2002, at F3 (noting that in 2001 mutual funds had $4.6
trillion in assets and hedge funds had $450 billion), with John Waggoner, Mutual Funds Top $10
Trillion in Assets, USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 2006, at 1B (noting that in 2006 mutual funds assets had
reached $10 trillion), and Hedge Funds Closed, supra note 94 (noting that in 2006 hedge fund
assets had reached $1.89 trillion).
97. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 8, at 986 (noting that a number of studies indicate that
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for as much as 2%–3% of daily trading volume.98
This enormous growth in hedge funds is arguably beneficial on purely
economic grounds because hedge funds can increase market efficiency,99
provide liquidity to capital markets, and allow investors to manage their
investment portfolio’s risk.100 These benefits accrue largely because hedge

hedge funds account for 40%–50% of the trading on the New York Stock Exchange and the London
Stock Exchange); Greg Ip & Henny Sender, Private Money: The New Financial Order—Cash
Machine: In Today’s Buyouts, Payday for Firms Is Never Far Away, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2006,
at A1 (stating that hedge funds are the biggest source of trading volume, accounting for half the
daily volume on the New York and London stock exchanges).
98. See Davis et al., supra note 11 (estimating that Kenneth Griffin’s hedge fund, Citadel
Investment Group, accounts for 3% of daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange); Pulliam,
supra note 11 (indicating that Steven Cohen’s hedge fund, SAC Capital Partners, accounts for 2%
of the overall stock market activity on a typical day); see also Marcia Vickers, The Most Powerful
Trader on Wall Street You’ve Never Heard of, BUS. WK., July 21, 2003, at 66 (noting that Cohen’s
fund accounts for as much as 3% of the daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange and 1% on
the NASDAQ).
99. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 4. However, at least two prominent
economists think that hedge fund benefits are vastly overstated. See Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu
Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 80, available at
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/faj.v61.n6.2775 (arguing that publicly reported hedge fund
statistics are skewed because hedge funds that perform poorly simply do not report and that
numerous hedge funds close each year); see also Steve Hays, Hedge Funds’ Success May Not Be
All It Seems—Study, REUTERS NEWS, Feb. 11, 2005 (reporting on Professors Malkiel and Saha’s
study). Over thirty years ago, Professor Malkiel earned public prominence for his book, A Random
Walk Down Wall Street, because he argued that a monkey throwing darts could pick stocks as well
as expert analysts. David Henry, Will Winning Advice Defeat S&P 500?, USA TODAY, May 18,
1999, at 3B. Malkiel’s argument is known as the efficient market hypothesis because it postulates
that the market cannot be “beat” in the long run because it is perfectly efficient, or nearly so, and
the market’s movements are random. See Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and
Its Critics, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 59, 59–61; see also Stephen Bainbridge, Random Stock
Traders at the ECMH; wi th a Review of Malkiel’s Random Walk,
http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/comments/random_stock_traders_an
d_the_ecmh_with_a_review_of_malkiels_random_walk/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). Thus,
according to Malkiel, statistically there is about a fifty–fifty chance that any hedge fund will beat
the market two years in a row. See Hays, supra.
100. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 4; Metzger, supra note 28, at 15.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has stated: “I do think it is important to
remember that [hedge funds]—by what they do—they do make a contribution to this country.”
Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 105th
Cong. 50 (1998) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System). Nonetheless, many have argued that hedge funds actually harm the markets
because they increase volatility, speculate, receive “favorable” treatment from brokers, and engage
in aggressive short-term trading strategies to the detriment of long-term investors. See, e.g.,
Pulliam, supra note 11; Scannell & Smith, supra note 15; Daniel Altman, Managing Globalization
Blog: All Talk and No Action, I NT ’ L H ERALD TRIB . B LOGS , Feb. 23, 2007,
http://blogs.iht.com/tribtalk/business/globalization/?p=375. Moreover, the worry of another
LTCM-type collapse and the systemic risk that such a collapse poses still lurks within the hedge
fund industry. See Paredes, supra note 8, at 983–85 (describing systemic risk and a systemic ripple
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funds “take the side of the trade that others do not want to take”101 and
because their active trading and research contribute to price efficiencies.102
Unfortunately, however, there is a dark side to hedge funds, and that side
has become more prominent and glaring in recent years.103
One of the SEC’s biggest worries recently has been that absent some
sort of regulation of hedge funds, it could not timely identify fraud and
other misconduct until after investors suspect illicit activity and contact the
SEC.104 Further, the SEC is worried about the growing popularity of
FOHFs, the increasing investments by endowments and pensions, and the
ability of hedge fund companies publicly to offer interests in their hedge
fund management companies105 because more unsophisticated individual
investors are impacted by hedge fund activities through these products.106
The SEC’s worries are well founded because hedge funds continue to
reach more investors and have been recently implicated in numerous
criminal activities.
For example, from 2002 to 2005, the SEC filed seventy-eight
enforcement actions against hedge funds, and most actions involved fraud
against the hedge fund’s own investors.107 The SEC has examined one
hedge fund on eighteen separate occasions because of the fund’s trading

that occurred, on a much smaller scale than LTCM, in May 2005); Ip, supra note 17.
101. Metzger, supra note 28, at 15.
102. McClean, supra note 28, at 114. Because hedge funds are always exploring new
investment opportunities, they are also willing to bet on industries and emerging markets that other
investors steer clear of. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Biodiesel Powers Up on Financing, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 21, 2007, at B13 (noting that hedge funds have invested in the fledging alternative fuels
industry); Alex Frangos & Jennifer S. Forsyth, Private Funds Show Interest in WTC Site, a Move
That Could Bolster Development, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at A3 (describing potential hedge
fund participation in the development of the new World Trade Center); Kate Kelly, Creative
Financing: Defying the Odds, Hedge Funds Bet Billions on Movies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2006,
at A1 (noting that some hedge funds invest heavily in movies).
103. In addition to the criminal activities the SEC has focused on, some hedge fund managers
worry that the increase in the number of hedge funds is limiting their ability to profit, and therefore
the managers must engage in riskier investments. See Pulliam, supra note 11. Moreover, as
discussed more thoroughly below, there is a speculative frenzy surrounding hedge funds. See infra
notes 247–52. “‘I think [the hedge fund industry is] an area where you have to be particularly
cautious, particularly when people are rushing like lemmings to get into [hedge funds].’” Hays,
supra note 99 (quoting Professor Malkiel).
104. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 76; see also Registration Under the
Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056–57 (Dec. 10, 2004)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
105. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 72,057–59.
106. See id.
107. See Bogdanich & Morgenson, supra note 15. From 1997 to 2002, the SEC brought 150
enforcement actions against hedge funds. Greupner, supra note 30, at 1569. Moreover, many of the
actions involved wholesale misappropriations of significant amounts of investors’ funds. Id.
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practices.108 In March 2002, during a period of massive hedge fund fraud
cases, the SEC prosecuted one hedge fund manager for covering up $400
million in losses.109 Further, in August 2005, Bayou Management LLC, a
$440 million hedge fund, closed down without returning any money to its
investors.110 Additionally, numerous hedge funds have been recently
implicated in illegal market-timing practices and insider trading.111
Another particularly troubling illegal practice that has only recently
come to light is hedge funds’ use of borrowed shares to affect shareholder
voting in publicly traded companies.112 In one instance of this practice, a
hedge fund borrowed shares, shorted the underlying stock, voted against
a buyout that would have increased the stock’s value, and then reaped
profits on the short sale when the stock plummeted by 18% the following
day.113 The current SEC chairperson, Christopher Cox, expressed concern
about this practice and indicated that a regulatory response might be
necessary.114 However, as seems to be the lesson from recent experiences
with hedge funds, “‘[t]he rules and . . . law simply haven’t caught up with
the marketplace for sophisticated trading techniques.’”115
108. See Bogdanich & Morgenson, supra note 15.
109. See Janet Whitman, Hedger Berger Nabbed—$400 Million Fraud Fugitive, N.Y. POST,
July 10, 2007, at 31.
110. See Milestones, supra note 6. A federal bankruptcy judge later ruled that investors who
lost money when Bayou failed could sue other investors who cashed out before the collapse. See
Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Moving the Market: Bayou Holders Can Sue Others Who Cashed Out Before
the Collapse, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at C3; see also Peg Brickley, Bayou Investors Who Got
Out Early Lose Their Bid for Pretrial Victory, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2007, at A4 (noting that the
bankruptcy judge denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that the investors who got
burned were creditors of the hedge fund and therefore entitled to the protection of the bankruptcy
laws). This is an interesting ruling, and if it is not overturned, it could impact the hedge fund
industry by making hedge funds riskier investments. Dugan, supra. As one attorney associated with
the case said in reference to the ruling, “I call it the ‘Hotel California’ syndrome for hedge funds.
You can check out anytime you like, but you can never leave.” Id. Perhaps in a response to this
ruling, after its collapse, Amaranth sent letters to its former investors in an effort to stem the
potential litigation against it. Week in Review, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Apr. 9, 2007; see also
supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing Amaranth’s massive loss in value in 2006). The
letter offered to distribute the fund’s remaining assets more quickly to investors who agreed not to
sue the fund. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Like the ultimate disposition of the Bayou
litigation, this recent move by Amaranth deserves watching because other hedge fund managers
are surely interested to see if such a move could insulate them from litigation in the event of their
own fund’s collapse. But see infra note 224 (noting that an Amaranth investor has already sued the
failed hedge fund).
111. See supra notes 13–16 (discussing hedge funds charged in market-timing scandals,
insider-trading activities, and other illicit actions).
112. See Kara Scannell, Outside Influence: How Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, at A1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting a partner in a New York law firm whose clients include hedge funds).
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III. GOLDSTEIN’S IMPROPER INVALIDATION OF THE HEDGE FUND RULE
The SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule seemed to be exactly what was needed
and none too late; it was a rule that would not overly burden the hedge
fund industry but would nonetheless allow the SEC to learn vital
information about the industry.116 However, Phillip Goldstein, a co-owner
of the general partner of a hedge fund, Opportunity Partners L.P., did not
see the Hedge Fund Rule this way, and unfortunately the D.C. Circuit saw
it his way.117
In Goldstein v. SEC, Mr. Goldstein challenged the SEC’s Hedge Fund
Rule,118 which amended the Advisers Act and would have required him to
register as an investment adviser.119 The Hedge Fund Rule required hedge
fund managers to look through the hedge fund and count shareholders,
limited partners, members, or beneficiaries as “clients.”120 This Hedge
Fund Rule changed the SEC’s 1985 safe-harbor rule, which designated the
hedge fund as the manager’s client and not the individual investors in the
fund.121 Mr. Goldstein challenged the Hedge Fund Rule’s modified
definition of “client.”122
Mr. Goldstein challenged the propriety of the amendment on two
separate grounds. First, he argued that within the Advisers Act, the term
“client” was not ambiguous and the SEC misinterpreted the term.123
Second, Mr. Goldstein argued in the alternative that even if “client” were
ambiguous, the SEC’s definition fell “outside the bounds of
reasonableness.”124 Clearly, the Goldstein court should have resolved this

116. As one scholar stated: “Even opponents of more hedge fund regulation generally concede
that the SEC’s adopted rule change is a measured step . . . .” Paredes, supra note 8, at 990. The SEC
noted an even more positive result from its investigations into the possible burden of requiring
hedge fund managers to register under the Advisers Act: “No [hedge fund manager] identified any
provision of the Advisers Act or Commission rules that, if applied to hedge fund advisers, would
[impede the operations or investment activities of hedge fund advisers].” SEC: HEDGE FUND
GROWTH, supra note 3, at 91.
117. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
118. See id. at 874.
119. See id.; Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 17 C.F.R.
pts. 275, 279 (2006), invalidated by Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873.
120. 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279 (2006), invalidated by Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873. In practical
effect, this change would have caused Mr. Goldstein, and most other hedge fund managers, to
register with the SEC as investment advisers. See Goldstein, 845 F.3d at 874. As a reading aid and
to avoid the cumbersome repetition of the phrase “the term client” throughout this Note, “client”
(and its derivatives) is set off in quotes when discussing its definition or its interpretation by the
Goldstein court or the SEC.
121. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (describing the SEC’s 1985 safe-harbor
rule and its effect on the hedge fund industry).
122. See Goldstein, 845 F.3d at 874.
123. See id. at 878.
124. See id. at 880–81.
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case within the highly deferential framework of the Chevron doctrine.125
However, the court’s decision to vacate the Hedge Fund Rule126 is at odds
with the Chevron doctrine and, more importantly, showed a lack of
understanding both of the purposes of securities regulations and of the
dangers that hedge funds pose to unsophisticated individual investors.
A. The Small Problem: The Goldstein Court’s Misapplication of
the Chevron Doctrine
Since 1984, when the Supreme Court decided Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,127 much has been written about
the two-step procedure for analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a
statute.128 It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the Chevron
doctrine at length; however, to understand the inadequacy of the Goldstein
court’s administrative-law reasoning, a basic understanding of Chevron’s
two-step procedure, and the high degree of deference that the procedure
demands,129 is necessary.
The Chevron doctrine derives from the following statement by the
Court:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
125. The Chevron doctrine derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Although the Goldstein court
gave only passing mention to Chevron, see Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878, Chevron provides the proper
analytical framework for this administrative-law question. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 255–56 (2006) (citing Chevron for supplying the proper interpretive framework); Food &
Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (same); Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992) (same); see also Am. Bar Ass’n,
A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 38 (2002)
(indicating that Chevron applies to agency interpretations when the interpretation was developed
after the requisite notice and comment period).
126. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884.
127. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
128. See generally, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997) (discussing the courts’ application and refinement of the
Chevron doctrine); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833
(2001) (same); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225
(1997) (same).
129. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 128, at 833–35 (describing the result of this
deferential mode of analysis and the changes it has wrought in the court system).
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on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In
such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
the administrator of an agency.130
This language has led courts to develop a two-step procedure known as the
Chevron doctrine.131 The first step asks whether the statute at issue has a
gap or ambiguity, and if so, the second step asks whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable.132 The second step of the Chevron doctrine is
extremely deferential to the agency’s interpretation.133
Thus, if an agency can show a gap or ambiguity in a statute, a court
will typically uphold the agency’s interpretation.134 The reason for this is
simple. For a court to invalidate an agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous statute, the court must conclude that the agency, which is
presumably the foremost governmental expert in its domain,135 interpreted
the statute “arbitrar[ily], capricious[ly], or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”136 Moreover, the Supreme Court seems to endorse the idea that
Chevron deference is mandatory in most agency interpretation situations
because Congress implicitly intends for courts to apply Chevron.137

130. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (footnote omitted).
131. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985
(2005) (referring to the analytical framework courts typically use to resolve administrative-agencyinterpretation questions as the Chevron doctrine); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240
(2001) (same); Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 647 (6th Cir. 2004) (same).
132. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable, 545 U.S. at 980 (noting the two steps required by Chevron); Food
& Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (same); Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992) (same).
133. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 417 (noting the high level of deference
that Chevron compels); Beall v. United States, 467 F.3d 864, 869 n.19 (5th Cir. 2006) (same);
Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 464 F.3d
229, 239 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 128, at 833–34 (same).
134. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable, 545 U.S. at 986 (upholding an agency interpretation as reasonable
under Chevron step two); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (same); Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 417–18 (same). But see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. at 160–61 (finding that Chevron applied but that there was no ambiguity in the statute at issue
and therefore the agency’s interpretation was outside the scope of its power).
135. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006) (acknowledging that agencies
have expertise and knowledge of their fields); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132
(citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991)) (noting that agencies have greater familiarity
with the facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects they regulate); United States v. O’Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 673 (acknowledging that an SEC rule is entitled to Chevron deference).
136. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
137. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 128, at 870–73. Merrill and Hickman argue that the
strongest and most plausible argument in favor of applying Chevron is based on the presumption
that Congress has implicitly commanded the courts to do so. Id. at 870–71. Merrill and Hickman
also discuss the benefits and implications of analyzing Chevron questions with this idea of a
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Therefore, the Goldstein court should have explicitly applied the
deferential two-step Chevron doctrine, also known as Chevron deference.
1. Chevron Step One: Is “Client” Really Ambiguous?
Under Chevron step one, the Goldstein court had to decide whether the
Advisers Act left a gap or an ambiguity in the definition of “client” that the
SEC is charged with filling or clarifying.138 The Goldstein court initially
pointed out that “client” may not be ambiguous; therefore, the SEC’s
Hedge Fund Rule should fail at Chevron’s first step.139 Under Chevron step
one, the words of a statute must be read in context—in consideration of the
whole statutory scheme and with a view toward the problem Congress
sought to solve—to determine whether Congress has foreclosed agency
interpretation.140
The Goldstein court had two main rationales for why “client” is not
open to the SEC’s interpretation: First, a congressional amendment in
1970 clarified that investment company entities, and not their
shareholders, are an adviser’s clients.141 Second, other sections of the
Advisers Act, the SEC’s own prior statements, and a Supreme Court
decision all demonstrate that “client” is clearly defined.142
Both of the Goldstein court’s rationales are without merit. The first
rationale is unpersuasive because it is contrary to prior and subsequent
legislative history. The court first looked to a 1970 amendment to the
Advisers Act that eliminated an exemption for advisers that advised only
companies registered under the Company Act.143 Using this amendment as
justification, the Goldstein court reasoned that there would have been no
need to eliminate the exemption if Congress intended shareholders or
investors in registered companies to count as clients.144 However, at the
time of the 1970 amendment, Congress disavowed any effect of the

congressional command in mind. See id. at 872–89.
138. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
139. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878–81 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The court noted that “[t]he
lack of a statutory definition of a word does not necessarily render the meaning of a word
ambiguous,” id. at 878, which is certainly true. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has stated that in
the absence of a statutory definition “[t]he existence of alternative dictionary definitions . . . each
making some sense under the statute, itself indicates that the statute is open to interpretation.” Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 418.
140. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at
132; Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 417; PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement
Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 796–97 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
141. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879.
142. Id. at 879–80.
143. See id. at 879; Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 24,
84 Stat. 1413, 1430 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2000)).
144. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879.
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amendment on “the existing exemptions from registration for investment
advisers . . . other than those advising investment companies.”145
Moreover, in 1980, when Congress again amended the Advisers Act, it
acknowledged the ambiguity of “client” but chose not to define the term,
except in reference to business development companies (i.e., venture
capital companies).146 Indeed, other than in the business development
context, Congress stated that the amendment does not suggest whether
“each shareholder, partner or beneficial owner . . . should or should not be
regarded as a client.”147 Thus, at the very least, Congress knew of and
chose not to eliminate the ambiguity of “client.”
The second rationale is unpersuasive because none of the sources that
the court refers to either speak to or about Congress’s definition of
“client.” The court looked to the Advisers Act’s definition of “investment
adviser,” the SEC’s own prior statements, and a Supreme Court decision
to demonstrate that “client” is clearly defined.148 However, taken together
these sources do not begin to show that Congress clearly defined “client.”
Rather, at best, they explain that a client typically receives advice directly
from an adviser who owes a fiduciary duty to the client, and such an
explanation of behavior is certainly not a definition of “client.”149 Under
the Chevron doctrine, the question is whether Congress has left a gap or
ambiguity in the statutory text, and not whether the SEC or the courts have
clearly defined terms within that text.150 It is doubtful that former SEC
statements or Supreme Court decisions can be used to show congressional
clarity at Chevron step one; therefore, only the language of the Advisers
Act is truly probative to a proper analysis. Indeed the SEC’s 1985 safeharbor rule, which the Goldstein court marshals in as evidence that “client”
is clearly defined, did not even conclusively foreclose differing
interpretations of “client.”151 Moreover, Lowe v. SEC,152 which the
Goldstein court used to show that the Supreme Court clearly defined
“client,” actually has no bearing on the definition of “client” because, as
the Goldstein court admits, “the Lowe Court was not rendering an
interpretation of the word ‘client.’”153
The Goldstein court acknowledged that its rationales were
unconvincing and that “client” is ambiguous when it summarily concluded
145. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1382, at 39 (1970); accord S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 45 (1969),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4940.
146. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 62 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800, 4844.
147. See id.; see also Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879.
148. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879–80.
149. See id.
150. See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text.
151. See Brief of the SEC, Respondent, at 29–30, Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873 (No. 04-1434).
152. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
153. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880.
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that “the Advisers Act does not foreclose the [SEC’s] interpretation.”154
Properly applying precedent to this conclusion should have compelled the
Goldstein court to uphold the Hedge Fund Rule as a reasonable
interpretation of the Advisers Act.155 However, the court did not properly
apply precedent and instead went on to invalidate the Hedge Fund Rule
under the arbitrary and capricious standard of Chevron step two.156
2. Chevron Step Two: Is It Arbitrary and Capricious to Equate
“Investor” with “Client”?
Under Chevron step two, a court must defer to an agency’s
interpretation if that interpretation is reasonable or permissible.157
Therefore, unless the SEC’s interpretation of “client” was “utterly
unreasonable and thus impermissible,”158 the Goldstein court should have
upheld the Hedge Fund Rule.159 Despite giving lip service to the high
degree of deference required at Chevron step two, the Goldstein court set
forth three rationales that purported to demonstrate that the SEC’s
interpretation was unreasonable.160
First, the court reasoned that the SEC’s interpretation of “client” would
create a conflict of interest by requiring the hedge fund manager to be a
“servant[] of two masters”—the hedge fund and the individual investors.161
Second, because the fundamental relationship between hedge fund
managers and hedge fund investors had not changed since 1985, the court
reasoned that the SEC could not change its interpretation of “client”

154. Id. at 880–81.
155. The Goldstein court probably would have preferred to dispose of the Hedge Fund Rule
at Chevron step one because of the difficulty in persuasively and rationally overcoming the high
degree of deference that Chevron step two demands. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying
text (describing the high level of deference that Chevron step two demands and the difficulty of
demonstrating that an agency’s interpretation is arbitrary and capricious).
156. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880–84. Although the Goldstein court strained itself in its
attempts to show that “client” is not ambiguous, the court’s own admissions mitigate the force of
its arguments. The court admitted that “‘[c]lient’ may mean different things depending on context”
and noted that an attorney–client relationship is different from an architectural firm’s client
relationship. Id. at 878; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407,
418 (1992) (noting that if various dictionary definitions make sense, then a statute is open to
interpretation); Brief of the SEC, supra note 151, at 29–30 (indicating the various dictionary
definitions for “client”).
157. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 417 (“If the agency interpretation is not in
conflict with the plain language of the statute, deference is due.”); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
158. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 881.
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 881–84.
161. Id. at 881.
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from the one embodied in the 1985 safe-harbor rule.162 Finally, the
Goldstein court reasoned that the SEC’s interpretation did not meet the
policy goals underlying the Advisers Act.163 As explained below, none of
the Goldstein court’s rationales are persuasive, and they all fail to give the
proper level of deference required under Chevron step two.
a. Imagined Conflicts
The Goldstein court reasoned that investors cannot be owed a fiduciary
duty, which they would be owed if treated as “clients,” because such a
requirement would conflict with the fiduciary duty owed to the hedge
fund.164 “If the investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the [hedge fund] is
also owed a fiduciary duty, then the adviser will inevitably face conflicts
of interest.”165 However, this conclusion is flawed because it does not
acknowledge that hedge fund managers generally owe investors a
fiduciary duty under applicable statutory provisions166 and under commonlaw precedents.167
Hedge funds are typically organized as limited partnerships (LPs) or
limited-liability companies (LLCs).168 Under the laws controlling LPs, a
general partner, the hedge fund manager, owes a fiduciary duty to all of its
limited partners, the investors.169 Likewise, under LLC statutes, the
managing member, the hedge fund manager, owes a fiduciary duty to the
other members, the investors.170 Thus, independent of the SEC’s

162. Id. at 882–83. As mentioned above and discussed more fully below, in 1985 the SEC
passed a safe-harbor rule, which provided that, for the purposes of the Advisers Act, hedge fund
managers could count the hedge fund as the client and not the individual investors. See supra notes
121, 151 and accompanying text; infra notes 180–90 and accompanying text.
163. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883–84.
164. See id. at 881.
165. Id.
166. See generally UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 110, 408 (2001) (providing that a limitedpartnership agreement cannot eliminate the general partner’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and care).
167. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (providing case law that indicates that general
partners generally owe a fiduciary duty to their limited partners); infra note 170 and accompanying
text (providing case law indicating that the manager of an LLC owes its members a fiduciary duty).
168. See supra note 3 (noting the organizational forms that hedge funds typically use).
169. See, e.g., Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing that a general partner owes a fiduciary duty to its limited partners); Thompson v. Karr,
No. 98-3544, 1999 WL 519297, at *7 (6th Cir. July 15, 1999) (“[I]n a limited partnership, the
general partner owes a fiduciary duty to the limited partners of the enterprise.” (citing Arpadi v.
First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335, 1339 (Ohio 1994))); Turner v. Ferguson, 149 F.3d 821, 823 (8th
Cir. 1998) (concluding that a general partner owes a fiduciary duty to its limited partners).
170. LLCs are a newer form of business entity; therefore, the case law is more limited than
for the partnership form. However, the scant case law has generally determined that statutory
organization acts provide that LLC managers owe a fiduciary duty to their members. See, e.g., In
re Provenza, 316 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2003); Salm v. Feldstein, 799 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105
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interpretation of “client,” a hedge fund manager necessarily owes a
fiduciary duty to its investors in virtue of the mere organizational structure
of the hedge fund.171
Moreover, almost thirty years ago, the Second Circuit implicitly
concluded, in Abrahamson v. Fleschner,172 that hedge fund managers owe
a fiduciary duty to their investors.173 In Abrahamson, the Second Circuit
concluded that hedge fund managers were covered as investment advisers
under the Advisers Act because they were engaged “in the business of
advising others.”174 The Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs, hedge
fund investors, were clients of the defendant, a hedge fund manager,
within the meaning of the Advisers Act;175 therefore, the investors were
owed fiduciary duties.176
The Goldstein court, however, attempted to dismiss the persuasive
effect of the Abrahamson decision by limiting the holding to the
“proposition that investors in a hedge fund may sustain an action for fraud
against the fund’s adviser.”177 This limitation is unconvincing given that
the Abrahamson decision repeatedly uses the terms “investor” and “client”
interchangeably, indicating its conclusion that hedge fund investors were
clients under the Advisers Act and thus owed fiduciary duties.178

(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[T]he managing member of the [LLC] . . . owed the [member] a fiduciary
duty to make full disclosure of all material facts.”); Tzolis v. Wolff, No. 108353/05, 2006 N.Y. Slip
Op. 50851U, at *8–9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 2006) (“Managing members have statutory and
common-law fiduciary duties to the members of the company.”).
171. Admittedly, hedge fund managers and investors generally can contract around the default
LP and LLC provisions. See, e.g., Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing the validity of a partnership agreement that waived the general partner’s fiduciary duty
to its limited partners when the agreement still provided that the general partner owed duties of care
and loyalty). Nonetheless, there are certain rights and duties that partners may not waive. See, e.g.,
UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 408, 410 (2001) (providing that the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care
may not be contractually waived). However, even if hedge fund managers may contract around a
fiduciary duty, it was improper for the Goldstein court to conclude, as the default, that hedge fund
managers do not owe a fiduciary duty to their investors.
172. 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), overruled in part on other grounds by Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
173. See id. at 870 (concluding that hedge fund managers are investment advisers under the
Advisers Act and that hedge fund managers advise their investors, who should thus be considered
clients).
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.; see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92
(1963) (concluding that the Advisers Act created a fiduciary duty between investment advisers and
their clients).
177. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under the Advisers Act,
even persons who are not clients to an adviser may sustain a cause of action for fraud against an
adviser. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2000).
178. See Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 870–71 (“[T]he [hedge fund managers] received substantial
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Therefore, whether under the organizational laws or applicable
precedent, hedge fund managers generally owe a fiduciary duty to their
investors, and such a duty has never been found to create a conflict
because managers’ and investors’ interests are perfectly aligned.179 By
failing to give proper Chevron deference and not appreciating the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between hedge fund managers and
their investors, the Goldstein court created a conflict where none exists and
improperly concluded that the SEC’s interpretation of “client” was
unreasonable.
b. Failure to Acknowledge Changed Factual Circumstances
The Goldstein court next concluded that because the fundamental
nature of the relationship between hedge fund managers and investors had
not changed, it was unreasonable for the SEC to change its interpretation
of “client.”180 In 1985, the SEC passed a safe-harbor rule that allowed
hedge fund managers to count the hedge fund, and not the individual

compensation for managing the limited partners’ investments. . . . [R]ecommendations were
intended to cover persons who made purchases and sales of securities with their clients’ funds. . . .
[M]any investment advisers ‘advise’ their customers by exercising control over what purchases and
sales are made with their clients’ funds.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the Abrahamson court
concluded that hedge fund managers were advisers to their investors and that those investors are
clients within the meaning of the Advisers Act. See id. However, the Goldstein court emphasized
one omission by the Abrahamson court. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879. The Goldstein court noted
that the original Abrahamson opinion stated that general partners were advisers “to the limited
partners,” but that in the final opinion, those four words were omitted. See id. Thus, the Goldstein
court believed this omission indicated that the Abrahamson court “expressly declined to resolve any
ambiguity in the term ‘client.’” Id. Taken in isolation, the Goldstein court’s reading may be
persuasive; however, given the entirety of the Abrahamson opinion, there is much evidence that
the Abrahamson court concluded that hedge fund investors were clients within the meaning of the
Advisers Act.
179. The reason for this is obvious: hedge fund entities are mere “legal artifice.” See Brief of
the SEC, supra note 151, at 40–41. The Goldstein court postulated that if a hedge fund was
contemplating filing for bankruptcy, then the manager would be conflicted because the interests
of the hedge fund and those of its investors are not aligned. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 881.
Specifically, the court suggested that the hedge fund manager, acting in the best interests of each
party, would advise the hedge fund to remain solvent but would advise the investors to get out with
as much money as possible by selling as soon as possible. Id. This suggestion, however, is blind
to the reality that most hedge fund managers invest substantial sums of their own money in the
fund. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Therefore, a hedge fund manager would never
advise the hedge fund, which is mere legal artifice, in any way that would be adverse to the
investors, including the manager herself. In reality, the hedge fund is a mere shell, and all of the
investors’ and the manager’s interests are directly aligned toward maximizing profit. Thus, no
conflicts exist because there is only one interest—the investors’. Admittedly, as the Goldstein court
notes, “form matters,” Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 882; however, the court should not have elevated
form so far over substance as to create conflicts where none exist.
180. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 882.
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investors, as a client, and the Goldstein court seemed to think that this rule
should forever bind the SEC.181 The court stated, “the [SEC] has failed
adequately to justify departing from its own prior interpretation of
§ 203(b)(3)”182 of the Advisers Act because the SEC has not shown “any
change in the nature of investment adviser–client relationships since the
safe harbor rule was adopted.”183
However, this reasoning contradicts administrative-law precedents. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that administrative agencies may
change their rules and interpretations, even in direct contradiction to their
old rules and interpretations. For example, in a 1973 decision, the Supreme
Court stated:
[An] agency may flatly repudiate [its prior] norms, deciding,
for example, that changed circumstances mean that they are
no longer required . . . to effectuate congressional policy. Or
it may narrow the zone in which some rule will be applied,
because it appears that a more discriminating invocation of
the rule will best serve congressional policy.184
Similarly, the Supreme Court suggested in Chevron that agency
interpretations must be subject to change because “the agency . . . must
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis.”185
Likewise, in a 1996 decision, the Court reasoned that “the mere fact
that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not
fatal. . . . [T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided
by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.”186 Thus, the
Goldstein court’s suggestion that it was unjustifiable for the SEC to depart
from its prior interpretation is contrary to administrative-law principles
and ignores the SEC’s reasons for changing its interpretation of “client.”
The SEC justified its Hedge Fund Rule by noting drastic changes in the

181. See id. at 879 n.5, 882–83. However, the Goldstein court failed to appreciate that the SEC
was not foreclosing differing interpretations of “client” in passing the 1985 safe-harbor rule. See
supra note 151 and accompanying text.
182. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883.
183. Id.
184. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973)
(emphasis added).
185. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984).
In fact, the Chevron doctrine springs from a situation where the agency interpretation was a
complete reversal of former agency policy. See id. at 857–58.
186. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (citations omitted); see also
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005);
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 186–87 (1991).
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hedge fund market, including the following: (1) hedge fund assets grew by
260% from 1999 to 2004, (2) hedge funds increasingly reached ordinary
investors, and (3) hedge funds have been increasingly involved in
fraudulent activities.187 Thus, “in response to changed factual
circumstances,”188 the SEC changed its interpretation of “client.” Clearly
then, the Goldstein court’s conclusion—that the fundamental nature of the
relationship between hedge fund managers and investors must change to
justify the SEC’s new interpretation189—is invalid.190
c. Substituting Judgment
Blatantly out of line with administrative-law principles, the Goldstein
court substituted its own judgment for the judgment of both the SEC and
Congress. According to the court, the SEC should have used different
criteria in choosing how to define “client.”191 The Goldstein court stated,
“If there are certain characteristics present in some investor–adviser
relationships that mark a ‘client’ relationship, then the [SEC] should have
identified those characteristics and tailored its rule accordingly.”192 Thus,
the court admits that the SEC gave a reason for reinterpreting “client,”193
but the court would have preferred if the criteria were narrowed.194 Under
Chevron step two, however, the court is not permitted to substitute its own

187. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877; see also Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055–59 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
275, 279).
188. Nat’l Cable, 545 U.S. at 981.
189. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883.
190. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. If the Goldstein court’s reasoning was
valid, agencies would be handicapped in reacting to changed factual circumstances. For example,
the EPA would never be able to amend its list of pollutants because the fundamental nature of a
compound (i.e., its chemical structure) never changes even if the surrounding factual circumstances
change dramatically (i.e., the EPA learns that the compound is destroying the ozone layer).
191. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 882–83. In addition to the changed factual circumstances, the
SEC noted that investors have different contractual terms (e.g., different management and
performance fees, lock-up periods, and “side pocket” arrangements) with hedge fund managers. See
id. at 882.
192. Id. at 883. The Goldstein court’s mention of tailoring is interesting here because only a
few lines further down in the opinion, the court criticized the SEC for carving out an exception
solely for entities with fewer than one hundred but more than fourteen investors. Id. Thus, the
Goldstein court simultaneously criticized the SEC for not tailoring narrowly enough and for
tailoring too narrowly.
193. That is, hedge fund managers and investors often negotiate different terms for their
advising relationship. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
194. Indeed, the court criticized the SEC for “painting with such a broad brush.” Goldstein,
451 F.3d at 883. Again, and it bears repeating, the court is not even internally consistent because
it later criticizes the SEC for tailoring too narrowly. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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judgment for the judgment of the SEC.195
Moreover, the Goldstein court went even further and substituted its
own judgment for that of Congress when it wrote: “[I]f Congress meant to
exclude regulation of small operations, it chose a very odd way of
accomplishing its objective—by excluding investment companies with one
hundred or fewer investors and investment advisers having fewer than
fifteen clients.”196 Whether these exemptions are odd or not, they are the
exemptions Congress chose.197 Congress did not choose “volume of assets
under management”198 or “indebtedness of a hedge fund”199 as its
exemption criteria; rather, Congress chose absolute numbers of investors,
and the SEC was obligated to fit within that framework.200 Thus, any
argument by the Goldstein court that the SEC should have used other
criteria to make its rule not only violates the Chevron doctrine but also
attempts to usurp Congress’s judgment.201
By not employing the proper level of deference, the Goldstein court
improperly applied the Chevron doctrine and ruled in a way that conflicts
with the applicable administrative-law principles.202 Further, and more

195. To repeat, in Chevron the Supreme Court wrote, “[A] court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
Thus, once the Goldstein court admitted that the SEC had a basis for counting some investors as
clients, then that should have been the end of the court’s analysis. See id. at 843 (“The court need
not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to
uphold the construction, or even the construction the court would have reached if the question
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (“Chevron requires a federal court to accept the
agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court
believes is the best statutory interpretation.”).
196. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883–84.
197. See supra notes 56–74 and accompanying text (discussing how hedge funds use an
exclusion from the Company Act—ninety-nine or fewer beneficial owners—and an exemption
from the Advisers Act—fourteen or fewer clients—to avoid registration under those acts).
198. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883.
199. Id.
200. It is safe to assume that if the SEC had in fact decided to use the volume of assets under
management or the extent of indebtedness to determine when to regulate hedge fund managers, that
decision would have been arbitrary and capricious under the Chevron doctrine because the SEC
would have relied on factors Congress did not intend. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider . . . .”); see also Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 125, at 42.
201. A fundamental presumption of the Chevron doctrine is that “Congress, when it left
ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would
be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to
possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843–44 (1984)).
202. Typically, if a case gets to Chevron step two, the reviewing court will uphold the
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importantly, the Goldstein court failed to appreciate how its decision
would undermine the primary purposes of the four principal securities
regulations.
B. The Big Problem: The Normative Failures of Goldstein and Their
Implications on Regulatory Approaches
Although the administrative-law shortcomings of the Goldstein opinion
are disappointing, the normative failures are much more significant and
detrimental because they serve as evidence, not only of the court’s
failure,203 but also of the current regulatory failures.204 First, securities laws
are generally designed to ensure investor confidence in the securities
markets,205 and unregulated hedge funds will increasingly undermine
investor confidence.206 Second, unregulated hedge funds pose significant
dangers to the individual beneficiaries of pensions, endowments, and other
agency’s interpretation because of the high degree of deference required at that step. See supra note
155 and accompanying text.
203. It is interesting, but perhaps not ultimately surprising, that the SEC decided not to appeal
the Goldstein decision. See Stephen Labaton, Is the S.E.C. Changing Course?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 2007, at C1. One law professor thinks that the current SEC “is starting to take an historic shift
away from investor interests.” Id. Indeed some investor advocates think that the current SEC is
“moving closer to the business view that the administration overreacted to the corporate scandals
that began with the collapse of Enron in 2001.” Id. One author notes that the current SEC
chairperson, Christopher Cox, is a longtime proponent of deregulation of securities markets. Erik
F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38
CONN. L. REV. 393, 393–94 (2006). Much like the Goldstein court, the current SEC is failing to
appreciate the normative standards established by the main securities regulations. There is great
irony in the SEC’s failure to appeal the Goldstein decision and its nice statements to the press: “‘If
America’s markets aren’t transparent and open, investors lose . . . we all lose . . . .’” Kara Scannell,
SEC to Investors: More Internet, Less Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at C1 (quoting
Christopher Cox, SEC Chairperson). The SEC’s failure to appreciate the dangers hedge funds pose
and its willingness to support extremely pro-business measures is probably just an instance of the
larger phenomenon of the backlash against protections enacted after the Enron and WorldCom
scandals of the early 2000s. See generally Gerding, supra (describing the recent backlash against
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the pro-business effects this backlash has to the detriment of individual
investors).
204. This Part’s discussion of the normative failures of the Goldstein court applies equally to
the current regulatory regime. Therefore, this Note uses Goldstein as a microcosm example of the
failures within the regulatory and political arenas at large. Part IV of this Note explicitly addresses
the shortcomings of the current regulatory proposals for dealing with the dangers that hedge funds
pose.
205. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (stating that the animating
purpose of the Exchange Act is “to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
confidence”); see also Paredes, supra note 8, at 990 (“[T]he SEC is charged with ensuring that
investors are sufficiently confident in the integrity of securities markets so that they do not
withdraw from the market.”); Greupner, supra note 30, at 1579–80 (noting that the Exchange Act
was passed to restore investor confidence and reinvigorate markets).
206. See infra notes 210–23 and accompanying text.
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charities that invest heavily in hedge funds.207 Finally, the growing
numbers of FOHFs and publicly traded hedge fund management
companies have allowed hedge funds to reach the individual investors
whom securities regulations are designed to protect.208
First, one of the primary purposes of securities regulations is to ensure
investor confidence in the markets.209 But the Goldstein court failed to take
any account of this purpose. This failure was a major misstep because
hedge funds, and the increased exposure of their illegal activities,210 erode
investor confidence.211 As one commentator writes, “Retail investors [i.e.,
unsophisticated investors] in particular might come to believe that the
market is rigged against them as they continue to read about hedge fund
antics.”212
On that note, because hedge funds handle enormous sums of money,213
they have access to services and information that few other market
participants have.214 These service and information asymmetries are

207. See infra notes 224–32 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 233–52 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 205; see also Karmel, supra note 14, at 936 (“[T]he SEC was created to
be the policeman of Wall Street, a regulator of the stock exchanges and securities industry . . . .”).
210. See supra notes 13–16, 107–15 and accompanying text. Even with the SEC’s increased
awareness of hedge funds acting illegally and the corresponding increase in enforcement
proceedings, without regulation or registration requirements, the SEC can gain only anecdotal
evidence about hedge fund activities. See Greupner, supra note 30, at 1572. Moreover, given the
SEC’s scant resources, it may be limited to bringing actions only in high profile cases while
ignoring others. See id. Thus, neither the SEC nor anyone else knows the true extent of the illegal
activities of hedge funds. This ignorance is particularly troubling because of the power hedge funds
have over the securities markets and all investors therein. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying
text.
211. See Paredes, supra note 8, at 1002 (noting that illegal activities by hedge funds may
damage investor confidence in the markets and that the SEC’s failure to regulate hedge funds may
further damage investor confidence); Ng, supra note 15 (“[T]he appearance of unethical conduct
by market participants could erode confidence in the securities and derivatives markets.”).
212. Paredes, supra note 8, at 1002.
213. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
214. See Laurie P. Cohen, Private Money: The New Financial Order—In the Know: Seeking
an Edge, Big Investors Turn to Network of Informants, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at A1
(discussing a “consulting” firm, the Gerson Lehrman Group, that has a network of 180,000
informants who disclose information about their employers to high-paying subscribed
investors—often hedge fund managers); Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Private Money: The New
Financial Order—Political Intelligence: Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in
Washington, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at A1 (indicating that hedge funds are increasingly hiring
lobbyists and paying them up to $20,000 per month for “political intelligence,” much of which is
market-moving information, from Congress); Henny Sender & Anita Raghavan, Private Money:
The New Financial Order—First Call: Worry Amid Hedge Fund Boom: Privileged Access to
Information, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2006, at A1 (describing the “symbiotic relationships” between
hedge funds and securities firms that compel those firms to give privileged information to hedge
funds in exchange for continued hedge fund brokerage fees).
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contrary to the principles underlying securities regulations215 and allow
hedge funds to make nearly risk-free bets.216 This leaves individual investors
with information from “‘the public domain [that] is worthless in terms of
making money.’”217 Thus, it is difficult for individual investors to remain
confident in an inherently risky market when the market’s biggest players
play by different rules and without any of the attendant risks.218
Moreover, the investment strategies that hedge funds use can raise costs
and lower performance for long-term investors.219 In general, unlike more
common long-term investors,220 hedge funds want volatile markets because
they make their money on volatility.221 As hedge funds continue to grow in
terms of assets and trading volume,222 their increased access to unique

215. See Paredes, supra note 8, at 1005 (“[F]ederal securities regulation is primarily orientated
toward investor protection in the sense of remedying information asymmetries . . . .”).
216. See, e.g., Sender & Raghavan, supra note 214 (providing an example of four hedge funds
that “used privileged information to make substantial capital gains with certainty”); see also
Mullins & Scannell, supra note 214 (describing one instance when hedge funds profited from their
large stakes in asbestos companies when Congress announced it was planning to implement a $140
billion public trust fund for asbestos-related liability claims). This practice of using “political
intelligence” to place sure bets is growing; hedge fund managers have begun looking at many
political issues, including Internet gaming bills, Medicaid reimbursements, foreign ownership of
U.S. ports, and corporate tax legislation. Mullins & Scannell, supra note 214. As one lawyer put
it, “There are a lot of savvy investors who have realized that there is a lot of money to be made
from what Congress does,” id., but only hedge funds have access to that money-making
information.
217. Cohen, supra note 214 (quoting a partner in a private investment firm that uses the
Gerson Lehrman Group’s consultant network to gather implicitly non-public information).
218. When discussing the early success of a hedge fund, one writer stated the advantage that
hedge funds have over other market participants like this: “Muttering began that fast-trading [hedge
fund] managers . . . enjoyed an unfair advantage over Main Street investors—that they were, in
essence, playing cards with a rigged deck.” Pulliam, supra note 11.
219. See Burns, supra note 14. Steven Cohen, one of the most prominent hedge fund
managers, admitted as much when he stated: “‘The old guard wasn’t crazy about me. I used to hear
it all the time. We were trading more than investing, and people frowned on it.’” Pulliam, supra
note 11 (quoting Steven Cohen).
220. See Karmel, supra note 14, at 929 (noting that institutional investors, like hedge funds,
“do not invest for the long term, but have a trader’s mentality . . . . [and] such trading strategies are
harmful . . . to the markets” (footnote omitted)).
221. See id. at 927 (stating that one strategy used by hedge funds, market timing, “results in
rapid trading during the course of a single day. Such trading contributes to market volatility and is
inconsistent with any concept of a shareholder as an owner of a corporation.” (footnote omitted));
Alistair Macdonald & Margot Patrick, ‘Macro’ Gang Hangs Tough, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2007,
at C1 (“Global macro, like other hedge-fund strategies, profits from bets on big swings, or
volatility.”); Thomas, supra note 12 (“Hedge . . . funds have been cited as contributing to volatility
in the commodity markets . . . .”). Thus, during the market’s collapse in early March 2007, one
hedge fund manager made roughly $250 million on the market’s volatility, while “a number of
small investors making more-mundane stock-market bets were left holding the bag.” Susan Pulliam
et al., As Market Fell, Some Big Names Won Their Bets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2007, at A1.
222. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text.
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information and their desire for volatile markets will continue to further
erode investor confidence. Thus, by ignoring the effects its decision would
have on investor confidence, the Goldstein court undermined one of the
fundamental purposes of the securities laws—promoting investor
confidence.223
Second, the Goldstein court failed to appreciate the significant dangers
hedge funds pose to the individual beneficiaries of pensions, endowments,
and charitable organizations.224 Although pensions, endowments, and
charities may fit within the statutory exemptions for sophisticated
investors,225 there is no requirement that their trustees be sophisticated.
Using wealth as a proxy for sophistication does not work with pensions
and endowments226 because the beneficiaries are the ones who are truly
exposed to the risks of hedge funds.227
There are numerous examples of hedge fund activities harming
endowments and charitable entities.228 For example, when a hedge fund
lost nearly $1.4 billion of its assets, numerous college endowments were
affected, including those of Yale University and Brown University.229
223. The Goldstein court mentioned the underlying purposes of the securities acts only when
it admitted that the Advisers Act was meant to “‘substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor’ in the investment advisory profession.” See Goldstein v. SEC, 451
F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963)). This admission is certainly important to the issue in Goldstein, but it is also limited
insofar as it fails to account for the other purposes of the other principal securities acts, which all
work together to promote the same goal of ensuring investor confidence. See supra note 205 and
accompanying text.
224. See Partnoy, supra note 77 (indicating that one in five pension funds invest in hedge
funds and that pension funds, university endowments, and other charitable organizations invest an
average of 10% of their assets in hedge funds). After the collapse of Amaranth, resulting in losses
of more than $6 billion, a pension fund was the first party to sue Amaranth. See Ann Davis, San
Diego Pension Fund Sues Amaranth Advisors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2007, at A7. Apparently the
pension fund was not interested in a quick disbursement of the meager assets remaining in
Amaranth. For a brief discussion of the Amaranth collapse and its attempt to limit its exposure to
litigation, see supra notes 11, 110 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 41–51, 65 and accompanying text.
226. Arguably, this proxy does not work well in any circumstance, but it is certainly much less
effective when it does not apply to the actual decision maker. See supra notes 50–51 and
accompanying text.
227. See Karmel, supra note 14, at 934 (“[T]he beneficiaries of [pensions, endowments, and
charities] are exposed to the risks of hedge fund trading.”).
228. In fact, the SEC noted that the pace of pensions and endowments investing in hedge funds
has increased in recent years. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 82–83. As the SEC
stated, “The collective indirect investment of the assets of less sophisticated individuals into
vehicles that are managed by entities that are not examined by the [SEC] leaves open the possibility
that the [SEC] will be unable to anticipate problems involving hedge funds that may invest on
behalf of these institutions.” Id.
229. See Milestones, supra note 6; see also Gregory Zuckerman & Henny Sender, Exclusive
Club: Ex-Trader Creates a Hot Fund, and a Traffic Jam, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at A1 (noting
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Similarly, in 2001, the Chicago Art Institute endowment lost at least $43
million when the hedge fund it had invested in nearly collapsed.230
Although the SEC explicitly justified its Hedge Fund Rule with reference
to the participation of pensions, endowments, and charities in hedge
funds,231 the Goldstein court simply dismissed this justification as
irrelevant in regards to the reasonableness of the SEC’s interpretation of
“client.”232
Finally, the Goldstein court’s decision undermines the normative
principle, inherent in securities laws, that the SEC should protect
individual investors.233 Within the last few years, two new hedge fund
products have caused the “retailization”234 of hedge funds: FOHFs235 and
publicly traded shares of hedge fund management companies.236
that the Harvard endowment invested $500 million in a new hedge fund, whose manager had never
managed a hedge fund before).
230. Ianthe Jeanne Dugan et al., Portrait of a Loss: Chicago Art Institute Learns Tough Lesson
About Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at A1; see also Arvedlund, supra note 96. The
Institute subsequently sued the hedge fund, alleging the hedge fund engaged in strategies that were
not disclosed and was thus perpetrating a fraud. Dugan, supra. After the Institute filed suit, the
hedge fund’s attorney revealingly quipped that the hedge fund manager could have used the
Institute’s money to “bet on the Super Bowl if he wanted.” Id.
231. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Karmel, supra note
14, at 934 (stating that the SEC was persuaded to force hedge funds to register under the Advisers
Act because much of the recent growth in the hedge fund industry had come from pension plans,
endowments, and foundations looking for new investments following the stock market bubble of
the late 1990s).
232. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 882. The Goldstein court opined that it might be true that
pension funds and other institutions were investing in hedge funds, “[b]ut without any evidence that
the role of fund advisers with respect to investors had undergone a transformation,” the SEC’s
interpretation of “client” was unreasonable. Id. This statement fails to consider the effect that
investments by pensions and other institutions have on their numerous individual beneficiaries.
Going forward, “an evaluation of the soundness of the country’s retirement systems cannot be made
without a better ability on the part of regulators to evaluate hedge fund activities” because of the
“extent that pension funds . . . are increasing their investments in hedge funds.” Karmel, supra note
14, at 945.
233. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 40, § 1.2[3], at 21 (noting that the Securities Act has been
recognized as the first true consumer protection law); Karmel, supra note 14, at 910 (“[T]he basic
purpose of the securities laws is investor protection . . . .”); Paredes, supra note 8, at 1005 (“The
SEC, at both the commissioner and staff levels, has long characterized itself as the investors’
protector . . . .”).
234. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 80–83 (explaining that retailization is
the result of a “significant number of less sophisticated investors . . . investing in hedge funds”).
235. “A FOHF is a hedge fund that utilizes a multi-manager, multi-strategy approach by
investing all, or a significant portion, of its assets in hedge funds.” Id. at 67. These FOHFs typically
invest in fifteen to twenty-five hedge funds, and if they register under the Company Act, they can
offer interests to all investors without imposing a minimum investment. See id. at 67–69.
236. Gregory Zuckerman et al., Hedge-Fund Crowd Sees More Green as Fortress Hits Jackpot
with IPO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2007, at A1 (describing the first, of what the authors expect to be
many, hedge fund management company to go public).
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Significant numbers of investors are purchasing interests in FOHFs,
which are investment funds that invest primarily in hedge funds.237 Today,
approximately 20% of hedge fund assets come from FOHFs.238 Because
the underlying hedge funds are completely opaque to the FOHF manager
and the individual investors buying into the FOHF,239 the SEC worried
about the public investing in FOHFs without any restrictions.240 This
opacity—a problem for sophisticated investors buying directly into hedge
funds241—is compounded in the FOHF product because the FOHF
manager may unknowingly duplicate risky investments and magnify the
FOHF’s risk exposure.242
Similar dangers are posed by the recent trend of hedge funds going
public with their management companies.243 When Fortress Investment
Group LLC went public, its shares promptly almost doubled in value
before closing 68% higher than their IPO price.244 As one commentator put

237. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
238. Gregory Zuckerman & Ian McDonald, The Wild West of Hedge Funds Becomes Tamer,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at C1.
239. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 64, 81–82. Hedge funds dictate how
they value their funds; therefore, investors cannot accurately judge the performance of individual
hedge funds, much less accurately compare the performance of any hedge funds. See Robert C.
Pozen, Hedge Funds Today: To Regulate or Not?, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, at A14 (“Although
several services now promulgate performance statistics for a substantial number of hedge funds,
there is no standard method for measuring performance or categorizing types of hedge funds.
Moreover, the existing performance statistics have a serious survivor bias: Any hedge fund with
a terrible record can simply shut down and reopen under a different name.”).
240. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the SEC, in part,
justified its interpretation of “client” with reference to the “birth of ‘funds of hedge funds’”).
241. The SEC noted that “[t]he absence of any form of independent oversight over hedge fund
pricing raises significant questions about the quality and fairness of the prices at which investors
buy or redeem interests in some hedge funds.” SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 80.
242. See id. at 82. The underlying hedge funds do not disclose their investment positions;
therefore, the FOHF manager cannot know whether each hedge fund she invests in is placing the
same bet and increasing the risk of her investments. See id.
243. See Annelena Lobb, Q&A: Opening the Hedges—What Will a Hedge-Fund IPO Mean
for the Industry and Investors?, W ALL S T . J. O NLINE , Dec. 17, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116611696223650358.html (noting that one hedge fund expert
believed that after Fortress Investment Group LLC, the management company for the Fortress
hedge fund, went public many other hedge funds would follow suit); see also Eleanor Laise, Hedge
Fund Beckons Small Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2007, at D1 (noting that many industry
experts expect hedge funds to make similar public offerings); Alistair MacDonald, Hedge Funds
to Tap the Public, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan 10, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116837977
930171843.html (noting that two large hedge funds are planning on listing on the U.S. public
exchanges and another is planning on listing on the London exchange).
244. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 236. As of August 2007, shares of Fortress were down
approximately 5% from the IPO price. See Megan Davies, Tumbling Markets Cause U.S. IPO
Jitters, REUTERS NEWS, Aug. 19, 2007 (noting that Fortress’s IPO price was $18.50 and that as of
mid-August 2007 it was trading at around $17.50). Although Fortress was the first hedge fund
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it, “[T]he offering is one of many recent signs that hedge . . . funds, once
reserved for wealthy investors, are seeping into the mainstream.”245 This
mainstream access is exactly what the SEC feared, and what, in part,
motivated it to enact the Hedge Fund Rule.246 Unfortunately, the Goldstein
court failed to account for this danger in issuing its decision.
A currently overlooked danger of the FOHF and the publicly traded
shares of hedge fund management companies is the speculative behavior
that individual investors will undoubtedly undertake now that interests in
hedge funds are available to them.247 Speculation in hedge funds by

publicly to issue securities in the U.S., nineteen private-equity firms and hedge funds sold shares
on foreign markets in 2006 (up from ten firms in 2005). See Zuckerman et al., supra note 236. In
March 2007, after completing the largest private-equity buyout in history, Blackstone announced
that it planned to go public. See Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender, Big Buyout Firm Prepares
to Sell Stake to Public, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2007, at A1. After this move, it is expected that other
large private-equity firms, including Carlyle, KKR, and TPG will go public. Id. Obviously, private
money in the form of hedge funds and private-equity firms is looking to tap the larger public
markets, and, in doing so, individual investors will be more widely exposed to investment risks. For
an interesting discussion of some of the current legal issues that private-equity firms face, see
generally Jessica Jackson, Note, Much Ado About Nothing?: The Antitrust Implications of Private
Equity Club Deals, 60 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming July 2008).
245. Laise, supra note 243. Although no one has discussed the inherent conflicts between the
hedge fund management company’s duties to its shareholders and the management’s duty toward
its hedge fund investors, this conflict is apparent. In fact it is similar to the worry that many have
expressed in regards to mutual fund managers becoming hedge fund managers. See, e.g., Greupner,
supra note 30, at 1585 (“There are still some potentially troubling issues that the SEC should
monitor as a result of recent trends. Most notable are potential conflicts of interest for a manager
running a mutual fund alongside a hedge fund . . . .”); Arvedlund, supra note 96 (“Conflicts of
interest could arise from the widely different fees, which create an incentive for ‘cherrypicking’—allocating good trades to hedge funds at the expense of mutual funds.”). Thus, a manager
may be bearish, and take short positions with its hedge fund, which would negatively impact its
long positions in a mutual fund or the individual investors in the fund’s publicly traded
management company. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 84 (“The investment
adviser [who manages a mutual fund and a hedge fund] may determine that an equity security that
the mutual fund holds long is appropriate for the hedge fund to sell short. The short sale
may . . . have a negative effect on the mutual fund’s performance.” (footnote omitted)). As the
number of publicly traded hedge fund management companies grows, scholars should take the
opportunity to analyze the inherent conflicts because the courts will certainly have to deal with
these issues eventually.
246. See SEC: HEDGE FUND GROWTH, supra note 3, at 78. In 2003, when the SEC published
its Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, it stated: “Although we did not observe an existing
retail market for hedge funds, the potential for that market is clearly at hand.” Id. Obviously, in
2008, a retail market for hedge funds does exist, just as the SEC feared it would.
247. See Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities
Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 372–73 (2006)
(describing risk taking and speculation as distinctively American behaviors that Americans will
continually pursue both to their benefit and detriment). The prevalence of speculative behavior in
financial markets throughout history is well documented and makes for an interesting study. See
generally JANET GLEESON, MILLIONAIRE: THE PHILANDERER, GAMBLER, AND DUELIST WHO
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sophisticated investors is well documented,248 and given the results of
Fortress’s IPO,249 it seems individual investors, whose access to exotic
hedge funds previously had been blocked, will turn to those funds without
accounting for the risks or demonstrable benefits.250 Importantly, the SEC
is also charged with controlling speculative stock market behavior,251 and
the Hedge Fund Rule would have served as a stop gap for some of the
speculative behavior that is rampant, and is sure to increase, in the hedge
fund industry. Once again, however, the Goldstein court failed to
appreciate this purpose of the Hedge Fund Rule, and this failure
undermined the SEC’s ability to control dangerous speculation.252

INVENTED MODERN FINANCE 167–90 (1999) (describing one of the first speculative bubbles and
disastrous consequences when it burst); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET 34–51 (9th ed. 2007) (discussing various economic bubbles throughout history). Further,
one economist’s view—that financial systems are inherently speculative and ultimately lead to
financial crises—has entered mainstream economic thought. See Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult,
Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2007, at A1. Unfortunately then, it
seems speculation and bubbles are implicit in our financial markets. But that should not stop the
SEC from trying to prevent them whenever possible.
248. See, e.g., McClean, supra note 28, at 135 (noting in reference to investors lacking
information about a hedge fund that “[i]t appears investors are speculating and exhibiting the type
of behavior consistent with a ‘bubble’ being present in the market”); Paredes, supra note 8, at
996–97 (“The concern is that if investors develop a ‘taste’ for hedge funds . . . they may not give
due attention to the terms and conditions of their investments or may get comfortable investing in
a hedge fund that is not appropriate for them.”); Zuckerman & Sender, supra note 229 (discussing
one hedge fund—whose manager is a first-time hedge fund manager who had not managed money
in years and would not disclose his trading strategy—charging over a 20% performance fee yet still
having to turn investors away). Zuckerman and Sender further state that “big investors today are
throwing money at the most promising hedge funds” just as they threw money at dot-com startups
during the 1990s bubble. Zuckerman & Sender, supra note 229. Further, “Just as the earlier frenzies
[i.e., the dot-com boom] ended badly, this one [i.e., the hedge fund boom] is starting to show signs
of fraying around the edges.” Id. The connection between the 1990s boom and bust and the current
behavior of investors in the hedge fund industry is gaining traction. See, e.g., Zuckerman et al.,
supra note 236 (“Frenzied investors are rewarding Fortress richly, striking chords of the dot-com
boom of the 1990s, when newly minted companies went public and soared in their first days of
trading.”).
249. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
250. This speculation has two layers: the individual investors speculating in the FOHFs or in
the publicly traded hedge fund management companies; and the underlying hedge funds engaging
in speculative investments. As one author describes hedge funds’ speculative investing nature,
“Hedge funds in particular are one of the significant forces in speculative markets.” Karmel, supra
note 14, at 913. Unfortunately, bubble behavior seems to be inevitable, and only proper regulation,
which the SEC is charged with implementing, can keep it in check. See supra notes 247–48 and
accompanying text. Even more unfortunate is that “the financial regulatory agencies, including the
SEC, have been more concerned about the promotion of trading efficiencies . . . than they have
been about preventing securities speculation.” Karmel, supra note 14, at 947–48.
251. See Karmel, supra note 14, at 913.
252. Unfortunately, the Goldstein court failed even to mention this fundamental principle of
securities law, either because it was unaware or because it substituted its judgment for the SEC’s,
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In the end, under two separate analyses, the Goldstein court failed to
reach a proper decision. First, it diverged from the applicable
administrative-law principles. Second, it failed to recognize the normative
principles underlying the SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule and the securities
regulations in general. Unfortunately, the SEC seems to be suffering from
the same failures of reasoning by retreating from its Hedge Fund Rule and
from investor protection in general.253 In effect, the current regulatory
proposals reflect the short-sighted rationale of the Goldstein opinion, and
the proposals will be ineffective in addressing the problems that hedge
funds pose to individual investors.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF GOLDSTEIN
A. The Inadequacy of Current Regulatory Proposals
The SEC chose not to appeal the Goldstein decision;254 instead, it has
proposed raising the financial requirements for investing in hedge funds.255

by concluding that hedge funds really do not implicate the dangers of speculation. In either
situation, this was a significant failure on the court’s part. After the D.C. Circuit subsequently
vacated another SEC rule, former SEC chairperson Harvey Pitt suggested that the SEC should have
won the case and that the D.C. Circuit simply does not trust the SEC anymore. See Kara Scannell,
Court Throws Out SEC Rule Protecting Certain Accounts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2007, at A6.
Whatever the merits of trust in general, it should have no bearing on judicial reasoning.
253. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s recent pro-business
trends).
254. See supra note 203.
255. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited
Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 404–06 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 275); see also, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Eases
Regulations on Business, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at C1 (noting that the SEC’s proposal
would raise “qualifications for investors in hedge funds, to a net worth of $2.5 million from the
current standard of $1 million”); Deborah Solomon, Regulators’ Hedge-Fund Approach: Hands
Off, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at C1. For a discussion of the current financial requirements that
the SEC is proposing to change, see supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. The public’s
response to this proposal is interesting, if only because the public seems to want even less
protection than it already has. See Bethany McLean, SEC Slammed Over Hedge Fund ‘Wealth’
Test, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 11, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/11/magazines/fortune/
sec.fortune/?postversion=2007021116. Although the SEC subsequently finalized a portion of this
proposed rule (i.e., the portion regarding the prohibition of fraud by hedge fund managers), the SEC
deferred a final decision about whether to raise the minimum financial requirements for investing
in a hedge fund. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72
Fed. Reg. 44756, 44756 n.2 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). The SEC justified its deferral of
raising the minimum financial requirements on the ground that it needed more time to consider the
comments submitted to it in May 2007. See id. This is an interesting justification if only because
the SEC was apparently able to sufficiently consider the comments regarding the fraud provision,
which were also submitted in May 2007. See id. Perhaps this is merely another example of the
current pro-business SEC’s unwillingness to extend any practical protections to individual
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Further, as a member of the President’s Working Group (PWG),256 the
SEC is encouraging hedge funds both to give more meaningful disclosures
to investors and to adhere to a set of non-binding principles and is asking
counterparties and creditors (i.e., banks and other lending institutions) to
help manage risks.257 Unfortunately, none of these proposals will
effectively address the dangers hedge funds pose to individual investors.
Admittedly, raising the minimum financial requirements is a necessary
first step to help limit, to some extent, the number of unsophisticated
investors buying directly into hedge funds.258 Unfortunately, however,
raising the requirement for direct purchases of interests in hedge funds
does not address the dangers posed to beneficiaries of pensions and
endowments259 or to unsophisticated investors by FOHFs260 and publicly
traded hedge fund management companies.261 Moreover, raising the
financial requirements does nothing to bolster investor confidence or
correct the information asymmetries that exist between hedge funds and
all other market participants.262

investors. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text (discussing the pro-business stance of
the current SEC chairman and how this stance has moved the SEC away from individual investors’
interests).
256. The PWG is chaired by the Treasury Secretary, and the chairpersons of the Federal
Reserve Board, the SEC, and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission are members. Press
Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Common Approach to Private Pools of Capital (Feb. 22, 2007),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp272.htm [hereinafter Treasury Department
Press Release]. The PWG was formed in 1988 “to further the goals of enhancing the integrity,
efficiency, orderliness, and competitiveness of financial markets and maintaining investor
confidence.” Id. See generally PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND U.S.
AGENCY P RINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL
(2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/hp272_principles.pdf
[hereinafter PWG AGREEMENT] (outlining the fundamental principles shaping the PWG’s approach
to private pools of capital).
257. Stephen Labaton, Officials Reject More Oversight of Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2007, at A1; see Treasury Department Press Release, supra note 256.
258. In 1982, when the SEC adopted the original safe-harbor rule for accredited investors,
approximately 1.87% of all U.S. households were qualified to invest in hedge funds; however, 8.5%
are qualified today. Scannell, supra note 203. By increasing the requirement from $1 million to
$2.5 million, only 1.29% will be qualified to purchase interests in hedge funds. Id.
259. See supra notes 224–32 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers hedge funds pose
to beneficiaries of pensions, endowments, and other charitable entities).
260. See supra notes 233–42 and accompanying text (discussing how FOHFs endanger
individual investors); see also supra notes 247–52 and accompanying text (explaining that hedge
funds encourage dangerous speculative investing).
261. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of publicly traded
hedge fund management companies); see also supra notes 247–52 and accompanying text
(explaining that hedge funds encourage dangerous speculative investing).
262. See supra notes 209–23 and accompanying text (discussing the erosion of investor
confidence as a result of hedge funds’ activities in markets, particularly as a result of the
information asymmetries).
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The PWG’s non-binding proposals will be even less effective in
addressing the problems and risks associated with hedge funds. As one
investor advocate stated, “‘These vague recommendations [by the PWG]
lack substance and specifics, making them unenforceable.’”263 Moreover,
the recommendations are a mere restatement, even if in a quasiauthoritative form, of the principles that already undergird hedge fund
activities.264
Moreover, none of the PWG’s proposals will help to mitigate the
dangers hedge funds pose to individual investors. For example, hedge
funds are already legally obligated to provide all material information to
their investors,265 and many hedge fund groups have released various best
practices.266 Similarly, the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve
already regulate all hedge fund creditors and counterparties; however,
these creditors and counterparties are willing to take unreasonable risks for
their hedge fund clients.267 Thus, the PWG’s proposals are really nothing

263. Solomon, supra note 255 (quoting the Attorney General of Connecticut, Richard
Blumenthal). Mr. Blumenthal also chided the PWG because its “inaction and inertia will
invite—indeed, fuel—state initiatives.” Id.
264. The PWG admits that it is not specifying any new standards when it states, “Since we last
made a statement on [private pools of capital] in 1999, the market has matured and expanded
considerably, and these fundamental principles have increasingly been reflected in best practices.
The current regulatory structure, which is also based on these principles, is working well.” PWG
AGREEMENT, supra note 256, at 1. The principles that the PWG refers to include the following:
“Private pools of capital can be an appropriate investment vehicle for more sophisticated investors,”
id.; “Investors in private pools of capital should obtain accurate and timely . . . material
information,” id. at 2; and “Concerns that less sophisticated investors are exposed indirectly to
private pools through holdings of pension funds, fund-of-funds, or other similar pooled investment
vehicles can best be addressed through sound practices on the part of the fiduciaries,” id. Thus, the
PWG did not say much in its agreement, but what the PWG did say assured hedge funds that it
would not pursue any form of regulation. As one commentator sardonically noted: “Well, it
shouldn’t have come as a surprise. President George W. Bush’s working group on hedge funds
finished its work with the stunning conclusion that . . . there should be no new regulations.”
Altman, supra note 100 (ellipsis in original).
265. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (indicating that to meet the exemption
requirements of the Exchange Act, a hedge fund must disclose information that is comparable to
that required for publicly offered securities). Of course, whether hedge funds ever give sufficient
disclosures is a largely unanswered question that motivated, in part, the Hedge Fund Rule. One of
the SEC Staff’s recommendations in 2003 was to require hedge funds to deliver to investors a
disclosure brochure specifically designed by the SEC for hedge funds. See SEC: HEDGE FUND
GROWTH, supra note 3, at 97. For a brief description of the disclosures hedge funds typically give
to their investors, see supra note 44.
266. See Paredes, supra note 8, at 1033–34 (noting that the hedge fund industry has promoted
a number of best practices and general guidelines and providing examples of such practices and
guidelines).
267. See, e.g., David Crawford & Carrick Mollenkamp, Bad Bet: How a Hedge-Fund Mogul
Disrupted an Austrian Bank, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at A1 (noting that after a hedge fund made
substantial money for a bank, the bank continued to aid the fund in its failed investments).
Moreover with the loosening of banking requirements, which has allowed financial institutions to
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more than a palliative for the hedge fund industry—assuring it that no
regulations are forthcoming.268
Now that the SEC seems unwilling to mandate any substantial changes
to the manner in which hedge funds operate,269 the burden of protecting
individual investors necessarily falls to Congress.270 To be effective,
Congress must take measured steps that reflect an international
perspective;271 otherwise hedge funds may flee the U.S. markets for more
friendly locales.272

operate securities business within their banking institutions, there is a significant danger of
collusion. See Michael J. de la Merced, Guilty Pleas and Charges Filed in Two Couples’ Insider
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, at C2 (noting that employees of Bank of America Corp. were
charged with participating in the largest insider-trading conspiracy since the mid-1980s). Such
dependence on lending institutions to self-police their behavior is particularly worrisome because
there is a dangerous trend in the industry to keep less money in reserve, which puts consumers at
risk. See Robin Sidel & David Reilly, No Worries: Banks Keeping Less Money in Reserve, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2007, at C1.
268. Unfortunately for all parties, “‘[w]e tend to legislate and regulate by crisis,’” and “‘[i]n
the absence of crisis, things go slowly.’” Mara Der Hovanesian & Dawn Kopecki, Where’s the Heat
on Hedge Funds?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, June 19, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine
/content/06_25/b3989062.htm (quoting Jonathan M. Winer, former deputy assistant Secretary of
State and partner in the Washington D.C. office of Alston & Bird LLP). Unfortunately, the next
time a hedge fund catastrophically fails, there may be a knee-jerk governmental reaction similar
to the one experienced after the Enron collapse and the corresponding outcries that the government
reactions resulted in overly burdensome regulations. See supra note 203 (discussing the backlash
against the ostensibly overly burdensome regulations that Congress enacted in a knee-jerk fashion
after the major corporate collapses of the early 2000s).
269. See supra note 203 (discussing the current pro-business trend of the SEC).
270. When the new Democrat-controlled Congress took control, the American Bar Association
noted that “[s]peculation abounds that businesses ranging from government contractors to hedge
funds to pharmaceutical companies could soon feel the heat of congressional investigations.” Molly
McDonough, D.C. Firms Gear Up for a New Congress, ABA J. EREPORT, Dec. 15, 2006,
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/d15memo.html. However, at least one observer views
congressional intervention as extremely problematic. “If the SEC gets knocked out, Congress picks
it up. And I think everyone would rather avoid oversight by a bunch of politicians.” Mara Der
Hovanesian, The SEC Isn’t Finished with Hedge Funds, BUS. WK. ONLINE, July 17, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_29/b3993055.htm.
271. For a brief survey of the regulatory regimes of various nations, see McClean, supra note
28, at 127–31. The international community has expressed great interest in studying the risks of
hedge funds and even regulating them. See, e.g., Joellen Perry & Alistair MacDonald, European
Banker Urges Disclosure on Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2006, at C4; Deborah Solomon,
G-7 Seeks to Shed Overlapping Regulations, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at A2; David Wessel,
Politics & Economics: Germany to Press G-8 on Studying Hedge-Fund Risks, WALL ST. J., Dec.
14, 2006, at A6.
272. For all the dangers hedge funds pose, they do benefit our securities markets and economy
by improving efficiency and promoting growth in areas where more risk-averse investment entities
will not invest. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
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B. Modest Proposals to Protect Individual Investors
Congress should consider the following four alternative measures to
protect individual investors from the dangers hedge funds pose. First, the
simplest and perhaps most effective way for Congress to moderately
regulate hedge funds is to amend the Advisers Act to incorporate the
Hedge Fund Rule’s interpretation of “client.”273 Due in part to the
procedural ease of this step, it would be worthwhile, cost-effective, and
feasible because the SEC has already gathered the material facts and
issued its expert opinion on the matter.274 Perhaps more importantly,
Congress could easily pass legislation substantially similar to the Hedge
Fund Rule because it could use the SEC’s expertise as a justification to
insulate itself from a potential political backlash.275
Second, Congress should look into granting intellectual property rights
to hedge fund managers who engage in truly unique and beneficial
investment processes.276 Bestowing intellectual property rights would not
only protect hedge fund managers who are truly benefiting the market with
their investment strategies277 but also would provide incentives to
managers to invent better investment techniques, further benefiting market
efficiency and all market participants. Most importantly, granting
intellectual property rights to hedge fund managers would limit the number
of hedge funds because once a beneficial and unique investment process
is patented, the patent holder would effectively monopolize the process.278
Such a monopoly would permit the hedge fund manager to charge other
managers a licensing fee or to keep the process to herself.279 Either way,

273. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,054–55 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
274. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing the Hedge Fund Rule as an
unburdensome and measured step); supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text (noting the SEC’s
justifications for passing the Hedge Fund Rule).
275. Using the SEC’s expertise as its justification for amending the Advisers Act may be the
only politically feasible option that Congress has because as hedge funds have grown in economic
influence, so too has their political influence. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Big Money Still Learning
to Lobby, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at C1 (noting that Senator Charles Schumer invited over a
$100 billion worth of hedge fund managers to a dinner to advise them that “[i]f [they] want
Washington to work with [them], [they] had better work better with one another”); Thomas, Jr.,
supra note 95 (indicating that hedge funds’ political-campaign contributions doubled from 2000
to 2006). Thus, as with all political issues, lobbyists have substantial power, and politicians are
loath to anger their political supporters. See generally ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE
TROUGH: HOW CORPORATE GREED AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA
77–150 (Crown Publishers 2003) (discussing the massive sums of money paid to politicians and
lobbyists in hopes of encouraging favorable legislation).
276. For a discussion of such patents in another arena, see generally Drennan, supra note 55
(discussing the patenting of tax loopholes as unique processes).
277. See supra note 55 (describing Phillip Goldstein’s threat of filing another suit against the
SEC on the ground that the SEC is stealing his intellectual property rights).
278. See Drennan, supra note 55, at 246–54.
279. See id. at 262.
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fewer managers would have unfettered access to unique and beneficial
investment strategies, which would likely raise standards for hedge fund
managers.280
Third, Congress should require hedge fund managers not only to
determine the wealth of their investors but also to assess qualitatively each
investor’s financial sophistication before allowing the investor into the
hedge fund. Undoubtedly, this is a feasible requirement because both the
SEC’s former regulations and Britain’s current regulations include this
requirement.281 Furthermore, there is no evidence that such a qualitative
assessment is overly burdensome or was overly burdensome in the past.
In fact, any argument by a hedge fund manager as to the possible burden
should be met with skepticism given the ultimate economic benefit most
hedge fund managers derive from managing their investors’ money.282 Best
of all, this requirement would make wealth only a necessary and not
sufficient condition for investing in a hedge fund, thus eliminating the
dubious proxy that wealth currently serves for financial sophistication.283
Thus, wealthy but unsophisticated investors would still be protected from
the dangers of investing directly in hedge funds.
Finally, Congress should consider imposing wealth and sophistication
standards on potential investors in FOHFs and in publicly traded hedge
fund management companies.284 This measure would most effectively
protect individual investors from hedge fund dangers; however, it is
probably the least likely to receive congressional support because it would
effectively eliminate these two investment products from the market.
FOHFs and publicly traded hedge fund management companies would
probably be eliminated because they are deliberately tailored to reach
unsophisticated investors who cannot afford to invest directly in hedge
funds.285 Despite this potential for failure, Congress should discuss the
merits of these investment products before foreclosing the idea of
imposing wealth and sophistication requirements on investors seeking to
buy into them.

280. In theory, a new market would develop where only patented processes would be attractive
investment vehicles because they would be the truly unique and beneficial investment strategies.
Thus, those managers who could not invent a new investment process or could not afford to license
one from another manager would fall out of the picture; therefore, the quality of hedge fund
managers should increase.
281. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
282. See Shell, supra note 5 (noting that the highest paid hedge fund manager earned $1.5
billion in 2005 and that the average pay for the top hedge fund managers was $363 million).
283. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
284. The risks of investing in FOHFs and publicly traded hedge fund management companies
are the same as those attendant to investing directly into hedge funds because they are effectively
the same product. See supra notes 233–51 and accompanying text. Investor protection measures
should apply equally to all products with similar risks.
285. Indeed, FOHFs and publicly traded hedge fund companies opened for the primary
purposes of tapping the capital available in the market from investors who are not wealthy enough
to buy directly into hedge funds. See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
For better or worse, hedge funds impact our financial markets in
profound ways. These impacts reach sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors alike, and although there once was a time when hedge funds
could be ignored as a marginal investment product, hedge funds have
become a major influence on global markets. The SEC’s Hedge Fund
Rule, which would have required hedge funds to open their books from
time to time to regulators, was perfectly suited to deal with the looming
dangers posed by these lightly regulated investment entities.
Unfortunately, in Goldstein, the D.C. Circuit failed to give proper
deference to the SEC and, much like our current regulatory and political
regimes, failed to appreciate the normative values that form the foundation
of our securities regulations. The Goldstein court improperly vacated the
Hedge Fund Rule and consequently re-exposed the markets to the
unmitigated dangers of hedge funds.
Going forward, the SEC’s new proposals will be ineffective in securing
our financial markets for the individual investors it is charged with
protecting. Thus, Congress is left to do the job that the SEC no longer
wants, and it will take both a bold and measured Congress to implement
effective reforms for the hedge fund industry. Let us all hope that
Congress can walk that fine line before it is too late.
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